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I.

A.

INTRODUCTION

Access to Justice and Litigiousness

S there too much or too little access to justice in the United
States? Are lawyers the problem of or the solution to the contemporary problems of access and litigiousness? In 1983, Derek
Bok, former dean of the Harvard Law School and then president of
Harvard University, expressed widely-held views in a broad critique
of the American legal system, the legal profession, and legal education.1 "The legal system," Bok said, is "grossly inequitable and

1.Derek C. Bok, A Flawed System of Law Practice and Training, 33 J.LEGAL
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inefficient. There is far too much law for those who can afford it
and far too little for those who cannot."2 Legal rules and procedures, he argued, are unclear and unnecessarily complex; lawyers
are too numerous and too litigious;3 legal uncertainty and conflict,
combined with overelaborate procedures, fuel more (and more complex) regulation and litigation, resulting in social expenditures on
legal services that have grown to about $80 billion annually The
excessive cost and delay have harmful effects on everyone: The
well-to-do are forced to pay higher transaction costs, and the poor
and middle class are demed effective access to justice. Bok urged a
combined program of simplification of law (delegalization) and

enlarged access, cautioning that either, by itself, will only make
things worse. Society, he asserted, needs simpler procedures and
fewer rules which are "more fundamental, better understood, and
more widely enforced throughout the society

"'

Simultaneously,

new forms of delivery of legal services could provide access to
justice to the poor and the middle class at reasonable cost and quality.6

EDUC. 570 (1983).
2. Id. at 571.
3. Id. Bok lamented that the wastefulness of our legal system "attracts an unusually
large proportion of the exceptionally gifted" college graduates:
The net result
is a massive diversion of exceptional talent into
pursuits that often add little to the growth of the economy, the pursuit of culture, or the enhancement of the human spirit
[F]ar too many of these
rare individuals are becoming lawyers at a time when the country cries out for
more talented business executives, more enlightened public servants, more inventive engineers, more able high school principals and teachers.
A nation's values and problems are nurrored in the ways in
which it uses its ablest people
As the Japanese [who have fewer lawyers] put it, "Engineers make the pie grow larger, lawyers only decide how to
carve it up."
Id. at 573-74.
4. For 1980, the gross national product of the legal profession in the United States
was estimated at about $30 billion. Lloyd N. Cutler, Conflicts of Interest, 30 EMORY L.J.
1015, 1016 (1981) (rough estimate by the author arrived at by adding the compensation
of all lawyers with that of their support staffs). Ten years later they are probably closer
to $80 billion. In 1987, the services of lawyers in private practice (not all lawyers) added
$62.3 million to the economy. Richard H. Sander & E. Douglass Williams, Why Are
There So Many Lawyers? Perspectives on a Turbulent Market, 14 J. LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 431, 435 (1989).
5. Bok, supra note 1, at 579-80.
6. Many of the same themes developed by Bok were forcefully presented by President
Jimmy Carter, speaking to the Los Angeles County Bar Association in 1978:
We have the heaviest concentration of lawyers on earth
three
times as many as are in England, four times as many as are in West Germany,
twenty-one times as many as there are in Japan. We have more litigation, but I
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Others echo some of Bok's critique without necessarily sharing his proposed cures. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, criticizing the
West's reliance on legal forms and requirements, stated that overemphasis on "the letter of the law" erodes moral values, creating
"an atmosphere of spiritual mediocrity that paralyzes man's noblest
impulses"

Former Vice President Quayle, speaking in 1991 to the

American Bar Association (ABA) in support of a battery of proposals designed to improve civil justice, asked: "Does America

am not sure that we have more justice. No resources of talent and training in
our own society, even including the medical care, [are] more wastefully or
unfairly distributed than legal skills.
Ninety percent of our lawyers serve 10 percent of our people. We
are over-lawyered and under-represented.
Excessive litigation and legal featherbedding are encouraged.
CT]he organized bar
has' opposed . efforts [that would
make legal services more competitive and more widely available].
Too often, the amount of justice that a person gets depends on
the amount of money that he or she can pay. Access to justice must not depend on economic status, and it must not be thwarted by arbitrary procedural
rules.
[We must] make the adversary system less necessary for the
daily lives of most Americans-and more efficient when it must be used. By
resorting to litigation at the drop of a hat, by regarding the adversary system
as an end in itself, we have made justice more cumbersome, more expensive,
and less equal than it ought to be.
. Those of us-Presidents and lawyers-who enjoy privilege,
power, and influence in our society can be called to harsh account for the
ways we are using this power. Our hierarchy of privilege in this Nation. based
not on birth but on social and economic status, tends to insulate some of us
from the problems faced by the average American. The natural tendency for all
of us is to ignore what does not touch us directly. The natural temptation
when dealing with the law is to ensure that whatever is legal is just.
President's Message to the Los Angeles Bar Association, PuB. PAPERs 834, 836, 839-41
(May 4, 1978).
7. Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn, Commencement Address at Harvard University (June 8,
1978), in A WORLD SPLrr APART, at 17. 19 (Irma Ilovayskaya Alberta trans., 1978); cf.
GRANT GrLMORs, THE AGES OF AmERICAN LAW 111 (1977) ("The better the society, the
less law there will be. In Heaven, there will be no law, and the lion will lie down with
the lamb
. In Hell there will be nothing but law, and due process will be meticulously observed:').
The head of the National Association of Manufacturers has argued that:
The excessive legalization of American society
manifested in the presence
of too much law, too many lawyers, excessive expenditure on legal services,
too much litigation, an obsessively contentious population enthralled with adversary combat, and an intrusive activist judicary-[has resulted in] a concomitant
erosion of community, decline of self-reliance, and atrophy of informal selfregulatory mechanisms.
Marc Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3, 4-5 (1986).
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really need 70% of the world's lawyers? Is it healthy for our
economy to have 18 million new lawsuits coursing through the

system annually'? Is it right that people with disputes come up
against staggering expense and delayY"8 Allegations that lawyers

bring frivolous suits, increase health care costs, stifle innovation in
pharmaceuticals and other products, and hamper the U.S. economy
in world economic competition were debated m the 1992 presidential election.
The underlying issues are important, complex, and highly
controverted.' The argument that American society is excessively
litigious and over-lawyered is challenged by leaders of the bar and

by a substantial group of legal scholars. Marc Galanter's studies of
available historical and comparative data on the volume and fre-

quency of litigation demonstrate that patterns of litigation vary over
time and place, but that current figures in the United States are not
markedly different from those of the American past or of other
countries with a similar legal system.'"

Recent decades have

shown, however, an increase in the volume, complexity, length,
and cost of high-stakes litigation, especially m the federal courts.
The critical question is whether the benefits of current litigation practices outweigh their costs. Americans resort to courts because other mechanisms of social control like family, church, and
neighborhood have lost some of their effectiveness. Some matters
that other countries handle without adjudication, such as compensa-

8. Dan Quayle, Isn't Our Legal System in Need of Reform?, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 19,
1991, at 9-10. Quayle's facts and proposals were immediately attacked by leaders of the
bar. See David Margolick, Address by Quayle on Justice Proposals Irks Bar Association,
Unsettles Lawyers, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 14, 1991, at Al, Ai4. Quayle's data was effectively
challenged by Marc Galanter, Pick a Number, Any Number, AM. LAW.. April 1992, at 8286. Although cross-cultural comparisons in determining the number of "lawyers" are
fraught with difficulty, a more accurate estimate would be that the United States employs
about 35% of the world's lawyers, not 70%. Id. at 82.
9. For a good survey of this subject, see Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Study on Paths to a
"Better Way"- Litigation, Alternatives, and Accommodation, 1989 DUKE LJ. 824 (discussing the issues surrounding litigation explosion and various alternatives).
10. See Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't
Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31
UCLA L. REV. 4, 5 (1983) (denying that a litigation explosion has occurred and arguing
that contemporary disputing is a conservative adaption to changing conditions); Galanter,
supra note 7, at 7-8, 10 ("Civil court filings are [not) dramatically higher than in the
recent past" and are comparable to those of countries with similar legal systems; settlement rates remain high; and the greatest single sources of increased filings are divorce
cases in state courts and social security cases m federal courts, which are not brought
because people are "enamored of litigation or beguiled by lawyers.").
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tion for accidental injuries, are left to courts in the United States.
The unwillingness or inability of other branches of government to
deal decisively with social problems including abortion, deficit
spending, or conditions in schools or prisons relegates problems to
the courts or encourages efforts to do so. The diffusion of authority among federal, state, and local governments adds complexity,
uncertainty, and opportunities for forum-shopping.
But are these aspects of American society vices or virtues? An
alternative vision converts what critics view as vices into virtues."
Governmental authority is diffused in order that liberty may flourish. The complex blend of reliance on private economic activity
and public regulation is designed to provide opportunity and materal well-being. The quest for equality in a society characterized by
racial, ethnic, and religious pluralism centers on the pursuit of
individual legal rights. The quest for accountability presses for fair
procedures and better outcomes in private and public institutions.
From this point of view, justice through law is a distinctive Amencan virtue rather than a vice. Those who share tins vision point to
problems of access and conclude that America is underlawyered
rather than overlawyered, or at least that the distribution of legal
services is badly skewed. Lawrence Friedman summarizes the intangible and immeasurable benefits of litigation: "[S]ocial justice;
expanded opportunities for women and minorities, expansion of
civil liberties, fair procedures within institutions, limits on government..
. Who would deny that these are significant gains?
Whether they are worth '1the
costs is a question that models and
2
equations cannot answer.
11. Deborah Rhode argues that determining whether a particular claim is frivolous turns
on normative judgments. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER (1989). In 1976.
a prominent legal educator, then president of the Legal Services Corporation, stated that
sex discrimination suits against Little Leagues were an example of "legal pollution" that
endangered the legal system. Thomas Ehrlich, Legal Pollution, N.Y. TMEs. Feb. 8. 1976,
at 17. But gender stereotyping in the provision of athletic opportunities in a society that
takes sports so seriously raises important social and legal issues. RHODE, supra, at 300304.
12. Lawrence M. Friedman, Lftigation in Society, 15 ANN. REV. Soc. 17, 27 (1989).
Marc Galanter states that the "consternation about litigation" is partly due to the accountability to public standards fostered by litigation:
The sense of being held to account has multiplied far more than cases or trials,
for it depends . not on the direct imposition of court orders, but on the
communication of messages about what courts might do. Law as a system of
symbols has expanded; information about law and its workings is more widely
and vividly circulated to more educated and receptive audiences
The
[former] predominance of cases enforcing market relations has given way to
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The purpose here is not to resolve the unanswerable questions
posed by the differing attitudes concerning the American reliance
on law, lawyers, and litigation, but to put more specific and perhaps answerable questions against the backdrop of the larger normative controversy Who uses the services of lawyers? Do users
receive services of adequate quality at reasonable cost? Are some
important "legal needs" left unserved by current patterns of availability and distribution? How, why, and at what cost can unserved
needs be met?'3
This paper addresses these questions in one of the two major
sectors of the legal services market-services directed to individual
clients. The other sector of the profession, namely services directed
to corporate and wealthy clients, encounters a somewhat different
array of problems and potential solutions. The corporate sector is
not discussed in this Paper.
Part I of the Paper summarizes background considerations.
Part E[ deals with more specific issues concerning the legal services
available to ordinary Americans. Part HI states the values of professionalism that guide the author's evaluation of specific proposals
for change. Part IV outlines a series of recommendations. Readers
interested in the evaluative portion of this paper should turn immediately to part III (professional values that serve as my criteria for
judgment) and part IV (my personal list of desirable changes).
B.

"Two Hemispheres" of Lawyering

Traditional legal ethics and bar ideology present an image of a
unified profession composed of professional equals. This myth of
professional unity, competence, and equality builds on the 19th
century tradition of the all-competent generalist lawyer whose clients were almost entirely private individuals. It is reinforced by
rules of admissions, ethics, and bar discipline applicable to all
lawyers. Yet, the structure of contemporary law practice resembles
two large hemispheres with modest overlap." The legal profession
tort, civil rights, and public law cases 'correcting' the market
[The increase in this type of litigation] by outsiders and clients and dependents against

authorities and managers of established institutions
proach

excites most of the re-

Galanter, supra note 7, at 38.

13. For an excellent collection of materials on topics treated more summarily here, see
DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHics 784-894 (1992).
14. JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD 0. LAUMANN, CHIcAGO LAWYERS: THE SOcIAL
STRUCrURE OF THE BAR (1982) (based on structured interviews of a random sample of
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is highly stratified and has a relatively clear status hierarchy. Vanation within the profession is best accounted for, not by the type
of legal services rendered, but by the social and economic character of clients.
The profession is organized in two hemispheres: lawyers who
serve individuals and those who serve corporate clients. Corporate
lawyers, who have fewer clients each year than those representing
individuals, are often engaged in "symbol manipulation;" those who
represent individuals are more often involved in "people persuasion." s Because lawyers respond to the interests and demands of
their clients, "the nature of the clients served
primarily determines the structure of social differentiation.
", Fields of
practice that serve large corporate clients, such as securities, corporate tax, antitrust, and banking, are at the top of the profession's
prestige structure, while those serving individual clients such as
divorce, landlord and tenant, debt collection, and criminal defense
are at the bottom. Lawyers who serve the core economic values of
American society are accorded more prestige than those who are
people-onented or cause-oriented. 7
The structural divide between individual-client service and
corporate representation affects the tasks that lawyers perform, the
recruitment and retention of clients, and the fee arrangements.
Because the pattern of lawyer-client relationships tends to vary
along the hemispheric divide, ethical problems take a somewhat
different form. A number of empirical studies conclude that largefirm corporate lawyers wield relatively little influence over their
powerful, informed, and wealthy clients. Lawyers in this sector of
the profession tend to view themselves as technicians who do what
their clients want."

777 Chicago lawyers in 1975). Other studies support the generalization of a legal profession divided into two hemispheres of roughly equal size. See RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS (1989); MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS
(1991).
15. HEINZ & LAUMANN, supra note 14, at 61.

16. Id.at 83.
17. Id. at 127-34.
18. See ROBERT L. NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER: THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION
OF THE LARGE LAW FIRM 255 (1988) (reporting that corporate lawyers very rarely refuse
a potential assignment because it was contrary to personal values); see also John P.
Heinz. The Power of Lawyers, 17 GA. L. REV. 891, 904. (1983) (stating that corporate
lawyers do not "enjoy a highly independent, autonomous role" but "Usually do their
clients' bidding"); Robert A. Kagan & Robert E. Rosen, On the Social Significance of
Large Law Finn Practice, 37 STAN. L. RV.399, 411-15 (1985) (arguing that the pre-
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On the other hand, studies of lawyers who deal with personalplight practice (representation of individuals who face a legal problem and who have had little or no prior experience with lawyers or
the legal system) emphasize the power and authority that lawyers
exercise over clients in those sectors of practice.19 Lower-status
practitioners provide the vast majority of legal services needed by
ordinary Americans. They also have the best socio-economc
connections to the potential clients of moderate means. These practitioners also have the least margin of profit for providing charitable or semi-charitable services.
The juxtaposition of these differing findings suggests that rules
of professional conduct should differentiate between sectors of
practice. The rules should adopt a client-protective ethic for lawyers serving predominantly individuals and small businesses (unsophisticated clients) and a lawyer-and society-protecting ethic for
lawyers serving large corporations and their managers. 20 In one
hemisphere of the profession, where lawyers are dealing with informed, experienced, and well-to-do clients, ethics rules would seek
to protect lawyer autonomy so that lawyers would be permitted or
required to be something other than the client's "mouthpiece" or
"hred gun." Simultaneously, ethics rules in the personal-plight
sector would seek to protect clients against lawyer overreaching.
Differences in the context of practice suggest that different regulatory approaches and sanctions are required in different areas of
legal practice to assure efficient compliance while protecting the
independence of lawyers.2

This organizational structure, of course, rests on rough-hewn
tendencies rather than sharply etched divisions. Lawyers and clients
in both sectors of the profession share common problems; and

dominant role performed by lawyers in corporate law firms is that of "nonjudgmental conduits").
19. See DOUGLAS E. ROSENTHAL, LAWYERS AND CLtENr' WHO's IN CHARGE? (1974)
(personal mjury lawyers); see also Abraham S. Blumberg, The Practice of Law as a

Confidence Game: Organizational Cooptation of a Profession. 1 LAw & SOc'Y REV. 15
(1967) (crunal defense lawyers); William L. F. Felstiner & Austin Sarat, Enactments of
Power: Negotiating Reality and Responsibility in Lawyer-Client Interactions, 77 CORNELL
L. REv. 1447 (1992) (domestic relations lawyers).
20. See Ted Schneyer, Some Sympathy for the Hired Gun, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. II, 2227 (1991) (arguing for the abandonment of the distinction between the hired gun and the
moral activist through a discussion of neutrality and partisanship).
21. See David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REv. 801
(1992) (arguing that a system of multiple controls is efficient and adaptable to professional independence).
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many practice contexts fall into an intermediate position (e.g.,
representation of small businesses). Yet, the "two-hemispheres concept" reinforces the desirability of considering separately the delivery of legal services to middle class and poor individuals.
C. Production and Distributionof Legal Services
The legal profession is a service industry engaged in the production and distribution of legal services. Tins suggests an analysis
at the outset of factors affecting the availability, cost, and quality
of legal services in the United States. A market analysis must
consider both the demand for and the supply of legal services.
1. Demand: Public's Use of Legal Services
Major corporations encounter few problems in obtaining adequate legal services. They are experienced users of legal services
and may choose who and how service is provided from a wide
array of individual lawyers, outside law firms, and inside staff
counsel. Market forces operate fairly well in this sector of the legal
services industry, although corporations may complain about legal
costs and others may complain that too many legal resources are
devoted to corporations.
Ordinary Americans, however, face more difficulties. A major
American Bar Foundation (ABF) study, conducted in 1974 and
updated in 1989, reports that over two-thirds of the adult population consult a lawyer at least once in a lifetime.Y For most
Americans, the exposure to lawyers is very infrequent. One-third
have never consulted a lawyer, and more than another third have
consulted a lawyer on only one matter. Only about 10% of Amencans report professional exposure to three or more lawyers during
their lifetimes.24

22. BARBARA A. CURRAN & FRANCIS 0. SPAULDING. THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBTic 79-81 (1974); Barbara A. Curran, Report on the 1989 Survey of the Public's Use of
Legal Services, in Two NATiONWIDE SURVEYS: 1989 PILOT ASSESSMENT OF THE POOR &
PUBuc GENERALLY 55 (ABA Consortium on Legal Services for the Public, 1989). The
1974 national survey of a representative sample of the U.S. adult population examined the
incidence of personal, non-business legal problems, and the use of legal services in their
resolution. The 1989 national survey indicated the changes that had occurred in the
public's need for or use of legal services.
23. CURRAN & SPAULDING, supra note 22, at 79. The percent of adults ever having
used legal services rose from 64 percent in 1974 to 72 percent in 1989. As of 1989, 39
percent of adults have used legal services within the prior three-year period. Curran, supra
note 22, at 57.
24. CURRAN & SPAULDING, supra note 22, at 80-81.
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Lawyer use increased between 1974 and 1989; most of the
increase occurred among persons over the age of 40.' High income groups use lawyers with greater frequency than lower income
groups: 49% of adults in the top quintile of the income scale had
consulted lawyers in the three years prior to 1989, but only 27%
of adults in the lowest ten percent used legal services during the
same period.26
The ABF studies also attempt to explore the prevailing conception of an unfilled need for legal services. Is there a vast, untapped demand for legal services that is not being handled for one
reason or another? Some of the possible reasons for unserved need
are: (1) individuals lack information about the legal character of a
problem or the value of a lawyer's help in dealing with it; (2) they
do not know how to find a lawyer qualified to handle the problem; (3) they believe they cannot afford a lawyer's help;" (4)
they lack the resources to pay even a small or reasonable legal
fee;29 and, perhaps most important, (5) lay persons fear lawyers
and legal proceedings, with attendant loss of control over their own
lives.
The ABF studies provide some confirmation of the hypothesis
of unfilled need. Individuals report that only a portion of their
"legal problems" are taken to lawyers, a percentage that is highly
variable. For example, 1 percent of job discrimination problems are
taken to a lawyer; 10% of tort problems;" 36% of real property
25. Curran, supra note 22, at 57.
26. Id. at 65.
27. "Finding the right lawyer" is the fifth most-frequent reason for not consulting a
lawyer (6 percent of total responses). Id. at 82. "'The overwhelming majority of persons
considering using legal services turn to friends and relatives for advice and help in choosing a lawyer. Almost 10% rely on advertisements and yellow pages." Id. at 59.
28. Curran reports that "[clost remains a significant element in the decision to seek
legal assistance. Those considering consulting a lawyer are most likely to refran from
doing so in the case of consumer and marital problems." Id. at 59. Cost is the second
most-frequent reason given for not consulting a lawyer (22 percent of total reasons). ird. at
82.
29. The 1989 ABF report concludes that "[c]urrent income remains the principal way
in which lawyers' services are financed by all income groups. Forty-two percent of those
of limited means pay for lawyers' service out of current income or by borrowing." Id. at
60.
30. The findings of the ABF study on "under-litigation" of tort problems have been
dramatically confirmed in the field of medical malpractice by findings of the Harvard
Medical Practice Study. See PAUL C. WELER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRAMCE:
MEDICAL INJURY. MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION 69-76 (1993)

(slightly more than seven patients in survey group suffered a negligent adverse effect for
every patient who filed a tort claim).
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problems; and 73% of estate planning problems (wills). The four
largest categories of work actually taken to lawyers by individuals
involve real property, estate planning, marital problems, and torts,
in that order. Variations in lawyer use are affected by demographic
factors such as income (those of higher income report more property and estate planning problems), sex (incidence of torts is greater

for men but women are somewhat more likely to consult a lawyer), and race (mnorities are more likely to consult lawyers for
tort problems but in general use lawyers less than whites).
Other efforts to measure the public's legal needs show that the
subjective experience of grievance is quite common," that some
grievances are much more likely to be pursued than others, 2 and
that low-income households eligible for publicly funded civil legal
assistance report many grievances for which lawyers were not consulted but would have been helpful 3
The time and energy of lawyers is primarily devoted to relatively well-to-do individuals, small businesses, and large organiza-

tions.O' Lawyers in private practice spend only a small portion of
their time in the representation of low income clients?' Only
about 4,000 lawyers work for the legal services organizations that
provide free civil legal assistance to eligible poor people. The

Council for Public Interest Law reports that in 1989 there were

31. See Richard E. Miller & Austin Sarat, Grievances, Clazms, and Disputes: Assessing
the Adversary Culture, 15 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 525, 536, 540, 543 (1981) (reporting that
40 percent of randomly selected households experienced a grievance involving $1,000 or
more during a three-year penod; 79 percent of those expenencmg a grievance made a
claim and 68 percent obtained some recovery, but only 11 percent filed a lawsuit).
32. See Curran, supra note 22, at 67-74 (giving results of survey of usage rates of
lawyers for home purchases, divorce, will preparation, and consumer problems). See also
William L.F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming,
Blaiming, Claiming
. 15 LAW & Sc'Y REv. 631, 653 (1980).
33.. The Spangenberg Group, Inc., National Survey of The Civil Legal Needs of the
Poor, in Two NATIONWIDE SuRvEYS: 1989 PILOT ASSESSMENr OF Tm PooR & PuBLIc
GENERALLY 37 (ABA Consortium on Legal Services for the Public, 1989) (finding that
80% of the legal problems reported by a sample of households with income of 125% of
poverty level or below did not involve legal services). Principal reasons for not consulting
a lawyer were cost (28 percent) and lack of knowledge about how to obtain assistance
(17.5 percent). Id. at 34.
34. The major exceptions are substantial personal injury claims likely to produce an
award from which the lawyer's contingent fee may be paid and situations in which a feeshifting statute will compensate the lawyer for a prevailing plaintiff.
35. See JOEL F. HANDLER Er AL, LAWYERS AND THE PuRsurr OF LEcAL RGHTS 10102 (1978) (estimating that only about 10 percent of the effort of those lawyers who represent individual clients is devoted to those with incomes in the bottom one-third of the
population).
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200 tax-exempt non-profit groups that devoted a substantial portion
of their resources to the representation of previously unrepresented
interests on matters of public policy, but these groups employed
only about 1000 lawyers. 6 Thus, less than 1% of U.S. lawyers
are engaged full time in representing poor people or otherwise
unrepresented interests in civil matters.37 Social advocacy litigation
which attempts to vindicate the collective interests of low-income
groups such as prisoners, welfare recipients, and victims of institutional discrimination is largely dependent on the efforts of this
small band of public interest lawyers.
2.

Supply of Legal Services

Regulation of the supply of legal services takes a number of
forms: (1) direct regulation of access to the profession (admission
requirements such as legal education, bar examination, and character-and-fitness scrutiny); (2) the prohibition on the practice of law
by nonlawyers (unauthorized practice); (3) restraints on the flow of
information about legal services (restrictions on lawyer advertising
and solicitation of legal business); (4) restrictions on the form of
delivery, such as limitations on group legal services, nonlawyer
participation in or ownership of law firms, and dual practice restrictions; and, finally, (5) a variety of particularized regulations
such as the local admission and local counsel requirements that
restrict multistate practice by licensed attorneys and the prohibition
of many forms of pro bono practice by lawyers who are federal
employees.
3.

Market Imperfections in Delivery of Legal Services

Prohibitions against the unauthorized practice of law prevent
those who are not admitted to the bar in each state from engaging
in the "practice of law" Is the resulting state-based professional
monopoly in the best interests of society generally or is it merely a
tactic by which the legal profession seeks to protect its own turf?.
Both conservative economists and Marxist analysts view much of
the profession's regulation of itself (usually through the instrumentality of the highest court of a state) as designed to enhance the
incomes and status of lawyers. Milton Friedman, for example,

36. See generally NAN ARON. LIBERTY AND JUSTICE FOR ALL. PUBLIC INTEREST LAW
IN TnE 1980's AND BEYOND (1989) (discussing the recent history of public interest law
and the persons and institutions who practice it).
37. Id. at 34.
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argues that fears that consumers are incapable of making choices
for themselves are paternalistic and unsound; registration or certification are adequate to meet information barriers3 Friedman
"find[s] it difficult to see any case for which licensure [e.g., exclusion of competitors] rather than certification can be justified."39
Restraints on competition have adverse effects on the quality, vanety, and cost of services. Innovation is reduced and the flow of
information impeded. And, almost inevitably, the producer group
will domnate occupational licensing at the expense of the public.
Persistence of occupational licensing and continued public
support for some types of regulation of legal and medical services
have stimulated economic arguments in defense of at least some
occupational regulation. The principal arguments that will be considered in the course of this paper are:
Information imperfections in the legal services market may
lead to consumer harm or a debasement of the quality of service.
- Some consumers of legal services may need to be protected against their own ignorance. They may be harmed as
a result of information deficiencies that are costly or impossible to correct. Individuals who have no experience
with lawyers and are involved in a personal plight, such as
physical injury, matrimonial breakup, or a cnminal charge,
lack information about choosing or supervising a lawyer.
The gap between the client's information and that of the
lawyer requires the client to make a leap of faith, trusting
that the lawyer is competent and honest. Professional regulation seeks to justify the client's trust by assuring a rmmmal level of integrity and performance.
• If consumers cannot differentiate between high-quality
and low-quality legal services, producers will not be compensated for the higher cost of high-quality service. Information asymmetry may result in a "market for lemons"
because producers are forced to make price and quality
reductions that lead to the sale of only cheap products or

38. MILToN FREDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 148-49 (1962). Registration, the
most minimal form of regulation, requires practitioners to register and meet minimal requirements, such as amenability to process; certification, based on attainment of educational or qualification standards, permits a practitioner to hold herself out as being certified.
Neither registration nor certification prohibits unregistered or uncertified individuals from
performing the activity. Id. at 144.
39. Id. at 149.
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low-quality service and the. market shnnking." The problem may be overcome by certification, advertising, or other
measures that remedy the typical consumer's information
deficiencies. Alternatively, a regulatory regime may define
performance standards and provide adequate incentives for
lawyers to invest time, education, and resources in providing quality services."
Neighborhood effects (externalities) of sufficient size and frequency may justify governmental intervention. Even if it is paternalistic and undesirable to deny consumers the freedom to choose
the type of service they want, costs to third persons or to the
public generally may justify regulation. If an unlicensed and incompetent person builds a bridge or skyscraper that collapses, huge
costs are imposed on others. After-the-fact remedies, such as negligence law, may not prevent a sufficient number of such incidents.
In the context of legal services, externalities come into play most
obviously when the issue is representation in litigation, which
involves the interests of the court, opposing parties, and the public
in just and efficient resolution of disputes. Regulation of advocates
may serve those goals.
Finally, free rider problems may support some governmental
intervention. Free riders are those who benefit from collective
goods without contributing to their payment. In a sense, the public
trust created by the profession's scheme of entry regulation and
control of conduct is a collective good of the profession or the
public. "[A]bsent effective regulatory structures, individual attorneys
will have inadequate economic incentives to avoid cheating; they
can benefit as free riders from the bar's general reputation without
adhering to the standards that maintain it."4
40. See George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons"- Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, 84 Q. . ECON. 488 (1970) (contending that market for lemons results
from asymmetric information and relating quality and uncertainty to the theory of markets); see also Hayne E. Leland, Minimum-Quality Standards and Licensing in Markets
with Asymmetric Information, in OCCUPATIONAL LICENSURE AND REGULATION 265 (Simon
Rottenberg ed., 1980) (discussing the use of asymmetric information and concluding that
certain markets may benefit from minimum quality standards); Hayne E. Leland, Quacks,
Lemons, and Licensing: A Theory of Minimum Quality Standards, 87 . POL ECON. 1328
(1979) (considering markets with asymmetric information and their quality deterioration).
41. See Robert Dingwall & Paul Fenn, "A Respectable Profession"?, Sociological and
Economic Perspectives on the Regulation of Professional Services, 7 INT'L REV. .OF L.
AND ECON. 51, 55 (1987) (discussing the role of professionalization in maintaining trust
and confidence in the market).
42. RHODE & LUBAN, supra note 13, at 647.
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How serious are these market imperfections? Are they applicable to all sectors of law practice or only a few? Would certification of lawyers be a satisfactory alternative to exclusive licensing?
Would provision of public information about the practice and qualifications of lawyers solve the information problem? Why not rely
solely on moral suasion and peer pressure from within the profession? Or is the current regulatory regime, including exclusive Iicensng, necessary? These are among the issues that will be addressed.
11.

LEGAL SERVICES FOR ORDINARY AMERICANS

A. Pervasive and Recurring Problems
Ordinary Americans want legal services made available to them
at reasonable cost by lawyers who are competent, diligent, trustworthy, and loyal. This section reviews issues relating to the competence, availability, and trustworthiness of the personal-plight or
individual-services sector of the legal profession. Special emphasis
is given to the possibility that increased competition within the
legal profession and with non-lawyer service providers would increase the availability and variety of provided services. The focus
is exclusively on civil legal assistance; the special problems in the
criminal justice field are left to others.
1. Competence and Diligence
Preventive measures to ensure that clients receive competent
legal services include bar admission requirements and continuing
legal education obligations.43 In general, seven years of higher
education, including graduation from one of the 176 law schools
approved by the ABA, are required in order to qualify for adussion to the bar in American states. Bar examinations, which have
been strengthened over the years, are designed to test legal ability
and knowledge.
Reactive measures, which are also intended to have a deterrent
effect, include professional discipline, civil liability for negligence
(legal malpractice), and sanctions administered by a tribunal in
which a lawyer is litigating (e.g., Rule 11 sanctions, contempt).

43. Thirty-five states had mandatory CLE requirements in 1991. Katherine Bishop,
Californa Lawyers Must Take Refresher Courses, N.Y. TMES, Aug. 9, 1991, at B7.
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Effectiveness of preventive measures

There is no evidence that the American legal profession is less
competent or diligent today than in the past. Several factors suggest the contrary- Legal education, on the average, has improved
dramatically since 1950.' Although quality differences within legal education continue, the range of difference from top to bottom
has narrowed substantially Schools at the middle and bottom of
the quality spectrum have improved enormously in faculty size,
faculty accomplishments, student-faculty ratio, breadth of program,
and resources. Continuing legal education has spread its influence
and increased its quality during the same period.
Selectivity in recruitment to the profession has also raised the
intellectual calibre of the profession as a whole. During the 1970s
and early 1980s, legal education attracted a large portion of highly
qualified college graduates, including more than forty percent of
Rhodes Scholars and Phi Beta Kappa graduates. 45 The larger demand for legal education allowed many more law schools to be
selective in their admissions. The intellectual qualifications of this
cadre of new entrants, who now constitute over one-half of all
practicing lawyers, were higher than at any earlier time since law
school became the major form of preparation for practice. Although
college grades, test scores, and other academic criteria do not exhaust the relevant criteria, they do result in a contemporary profession that is generally intelligent, energetic, and ambitious.
The steady increase in de facto specialization by lawyers suggests that clients generally have been served by lawyers who were
more competent to perform the particular task than formerly was
the case. The possible trade-off, in a more specialized and fragmented professional world, is that the wise judgment of the broadly
experienced legal counselor may be less frequently encountered.
b. Effectiveness of reactive measures
Professional discipline plays only a minor role in assuring
competence. Although Model Rule 1.1 states "[a] lawyer shall
provide competent representation to a client," discipline for incompetence is exceptional. The disciplinary process limits itself primarily to intentional wrongdoing by lawyers. Competence becomes an

44. See Roger C. Cramton, LAWYER COMPETENCE AND THE LAW ScHoOLs, 4 U. ARK.
LrrrLE ROCK LJ. 1, 6 (1981).

45. Bok, supra note 1, at 573.
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issue only if repeated and egregious in nature or when combined
with other serious misconduct.46 The disciplinary process would
need to be transformed and expanded to deal effectively with instances of incompetent representation.
Unlike discipline, legal malpractice liability has emerged as a
form of accountability that polices the profession and protects
consumers4 Some years ago the judiciary provided lawyers with
a more protective legal regime than that in which physicians were
required to practice. But the gap has been closing rapidly in recent
years. Lawyers of means must insure themselves against malpractice liability as prudent protection against potential calamity. The
risk-management efforts of malpractice insurers and the growing
costs to lawyers of adequate coverage provide incentives that generally benefit consumers by deterring careless lawyenng.
Fears of malpractice liability, often exaggerated in the same
way that physicians exaggerate their malpractice exposure, have
important effects on contemporary law practice. Liability for negligence buttresses quality-control ideas that are also engendered by
professional and reputational concerns. These effects are especially
powerful in partnership practice where the economic well-being of
all may turn on the lack of care of a single lawyer. Concerns
about malpractice liability exercised a powerful shaping influence
in the drafting of the Model Rules because of fears that disciplinary standards would be treated by courts as liability standards.
Recent decisions holding lawyers liable to non-clients for negligent
misrepresentation and fraud have led to higher malpractice rates
and strong expressions of professional concern.
Neither the profession nor the state requires lawyers to carry
malpractice coverage (malpractice insurance is required in one or
two jurisdictions). A significant number of lawyers, especially those
46. See Susan R. Martyn, Lawyer Competence and Lawyer Discipline: Beyond the
Bar?, 69 GEO. LJ. 705, 716 & n.75 (1981) (examining the efficiency of the bar disciplinary process and suggesting alternative competency controls). Court opinions often state
that it is inappropnate to impose discipline for conduct that amounts "only" to negligent
malpractice. See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Neale, 384 So.2d 1264, 1265 (Fla. 1980); RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF THE STATE BAR OF CAL. 3-110(A) (1993) (limiting discipline

to situations in which a lawyer "intentionally, recklessly, or repeatedly fail(s] to perform
legal services with competence").
47. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHics 209-27 (1986) (surveying the
substantive law of legal malpractice liability and providing citations to relevant authorities
and articles). An introductory section collects materials discussing the rationale of this
form of accountability to clients, the growth in legal malpractice cases and awards, and
the preventive efforts of malpractice insurers. Id. at 206-09.
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struggling to make a living in handling small matters for individual
clients, have neither malpractice coverage nor substantial personal
assets that could be called upon to satisfy a malpractice judgment.
Whether malpractice insurance should be required, and in what
form and amount, is an issue that deserves the attention of the bar
and the public.
2. Cost
During the 20th century, the cost of legal services has been
affected by increased legal complexity, specialization, development
of technology, and increasing entry costs. Specialists command
larger incomes and technology is expensive, but cost increases due
to these factors are partially or totally offset by gains in efficiency.
Greater legal complexity, caused in part by the overload of intricate and often conflicting statutory, regulatory, and decisional law,
has created demand for legal services and added to the expense of
individual matters. Finally, the increasing costs of becoming a
lawyer, discussed below, have added a substantial amount, perhaps
$20 per billable hour, to legal fees.
The ABA's efforts to assure the competence of new entrants
have had the effect of increasing the cost as well as the quality of
legal education. When the opportunity costs of foregone income are
taken into account, the investment in human capital presently required to become a lawyer amounts to at least $100,000. This
amount is less than is required to establish many small businesses,
but does reflect a substantial investment on the part of the new
lawyer. Because entry costs become part of the cost structure of
the profession, average hourly fees or other charges reflect these
costs.
A serious question, infrequently discussed, is whether the required preparation and its cost are essential in all areas of law
practice. Some types of routine client service, such as sales of
residences, simple wills, and uncontested divorces, may not require
lawyers who are as thoroughly educated and as costly as lawyers

48. Roger C. Cramton, The Trouble with Lawyers (and Law Schools), 35 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 359. 364 n.15 (1985). For a discussion of the costs of legal education, see John
R. Kramer, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LEGAL EDUCArTON FOR
A CHANGING PROFESSION 93, 94 (Kathleen S. Grove ed., March 25-27, 1988) (law school
tuition has increased much faster than the consumer price index; most of the increased
revenues have gone to increased faculty salaries and expanded administrative staffs rather
than to increase the number of faculty or expansion of the educational program).
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are today. If these and other areas are opened to competition from
other service providers, a market test of price and quality would be
provided.
3. Availability
Are legal services of reasonable cost, quality, and variety available to those other than the rich? The subject is a complex one
that relates to virtually everything discussed in this paper. For
those who can pay reasonable charges, a competitive marketplace
for legal services offers the potential of providing services that
consumers want at prices they are willing to pay. Part C, below,
considers some current restrictions on competition in legal services.
For those who are unable to meet even reasonable charges, other
mechanisms are necessary to provide free or reduced-fee service.
Two major devices, mandatory pro bono and publicly funded civil
legal assistance, are considered in parts D and E, below.
4. Trust, Loyalty and Integrity
a. Asymmetry of information and the "necessityfor-trust" argument
The linchpin of the arguments supporting the exclusive professional license is the claim that the lawyer-client relationship is an
asymmetric one: Clients cannot adequately evaluate the quality of
the service, and consequently they must trust those they consult. It
is this theory, generally, that overcomes the strong presumption in
economics that occupational licensing is a form of cartel activity
that restrains trade to the disadvantage of consumers and the public.
Indeed, much of the specific content of former and current
professional self-regulation falls neatly within the econormst's catalog of anticompetitive practices: entry restrictions that protect incumbents against new competition;49 market-division strategies that
limit the competition of lawyers with one another,"0 and restraints
49. Current entry restrictions in American states generally include all of the following:
(1) a college degree or three years of college study; (2) graduation from an ABA-approved law school; (3) passage of a bar examnation; and (4) approval by the bar's character and fitness committee. See AMERIcAN BAR ASSOCIATION & NATIoNAL CONFERENCE
OF BAR EXAMINERS, COMPREHENSIVE GUImE TO BAR ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS 1992-93
(1992) (contaming a listing of the bar admission requirements of each state). Admission to
practice m United States District Courts is dependent upon admission to the bar of the
state in which the court sits.
50. A classic example is the division of the profession in England into solicitors, who

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[V/ol. 44:531

on price and service."' Minimum fee schedules and the total prohibition of advertising are examples of prior professional practices
that are now viewed as unreasonably limting price and service
competition.52
The necessity-for-trust claim involves both a theoretical argument and a factual predicate. The theoretical argument is derived
from the branch of welfare economics that considers deficiencies in

information on the part of some market participants as an
externality or market imperfection. As previously indicated,53 the
argument is that, since consumers cannot evaluate the quality of
legal services, they have no basis for choosing high-quality producers rather than those of lower quality If this is the case, the argument continues, high-quality producers have no way of assuring the
additional compensation that their higher quality of service is worth
deal with clients, and barristers, who try cases. Although this requirement assures that
litigants are represented by lawyers who are professionally chosen, and results in a small
and tightly-knit bar that is very responsive to the judiciary and to peer influence, the
client is required to hire at least two lawyers for each litigated matter and members of
each professional group are prevented from competing with those in the other. A further
informal practice applicable to the most highly qualified group of barristers, those who
have been made "QCs," requires a junior barrister to assist, insuring that three lawyers
will be required to be in attendance at all times. The Thatcher government challenged
some of these restraints in 1988 and modest reforms are emerging. See Professionals
Under Attack, LONDON TIMES, Mar. 13, 1988, at AS.
In the United States, the major current restrictions of this type relate to: (1) form of
practice (sharing legal fees with a nonlawyer or practicing with non-lawyers or in an
organization with nonlawyer owners); see MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCT Rule
5A (1990); (2) unauthorized practice; see id. at Rule 5.5; and (3) the surviving restrictions on lawyer advertising and solicitation of legal services (e.g., some states discourage
ads by requiring disclaimers while others prohibit some types of radio and television
advertising, especially those involving endorsements, dramatizations, or symbolic appeals);
see id Rules 7.1-7.5.
51. Professional codes limit the range of permitted lawyer-client fee arrangements, id.
at Rule 1.5. regulate referral arrangements and fees, id. at Rule 1.5(e), regulate transactions, such as loans, between lawyer and client, id. at Rules 1.7-1.8, and require that
communication between lawyers for represented parties be conducted only through the
lawyer representing the other party, id. at Rule 4.2.
52. Minimum fee schedules were struck down in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421
U.S. 773, 793 (1975), as violative of federal antitrust policy which extended to
"anticompetitive conduct by lawyers." Truthful advertisements about the availability and
terms of sale of routine legal services were included with the ambit of the commercial
speech protected by the First Amendment in Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 380-82
(1977). A series of subsequent decisions has extended the permissible arena of lawyer
advertising. See, e.g., Shapem v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 478-80 (1988) (court
rule prohibiting advertising appeals by mail to those known to have a specific legal problem violated the First Amendment). But areas of uncertainty remain, especially in connection with the use of radio and television advertising.
53. See supra text accompanying notes 38-41.
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(and perhaps costs). The socially undesirable result, given the importance to the public of quality in the provision of justice, is that
high-quality producers will be driven from the market or forced to
reduce the quality of their services. Neither clients nor the public
receive the higher quality of legal services which they want and
would be willing to pay for if they could differentiate the quality
of service offered by individual lawyers.
Under tius theory, accepted today by a substantial number of
economists, it is the social desirability of encouraging high-quality
producers that may justify self-regulation, some degree of exclusive
licensing, or other professional privileges. Special privileges are
granted so that the average competence, trustworthiness, and public
spiritedness of lawyers will be increased to approximately what
they would be if the market imperfection did not exist, i.e., if
clients were fully informed and could evaluate the quality of legal
services.

Even if the theory is sound, however, its factual predicate must
be demonstrated rather than taken for granted. Are clients able to
evaluate reasonably well, even if not perfectly, the quality of legal
services they want or require? The answer, in all probability, is not
a global "yes" or "no," but a more qualified response based on the
relative plausibility of the information-asymmetry argument in
different practice contexts. The necessity-for-trust claim, I believe,
is generally stronger in medicine than in law, partly because the
information gap between doctor and patient is wider than it is in
law and partly because patients are typically sick individuals who
are less able to remedy their information deficiencies. In the practice of law, however, the strength of the necessity-for-trust claim is
ughly variable depending upon the context of practice.
Does self-regulation assure a trustworthy profession? Are lawyers more or less trustworthy than they were in the past? No one
knows. Instances of professional discipline involving breaches of
trust have increased somewhat over time; but this change probably
reflects the larger size of the profession and more vigorous disciplinary enforcement.m Professional discipline has increased markedly in its soplustication and magnitude, as professional staffs have
supplemented the volunteer efforts of practicing lawyers. Special
54. See generally Eric H. Steele & Raymond T. Nimmer, Laiyers, Clients, and Profes-

sional Regulation, 1976 AM. B. FOUND. RES. L 917 (analyzing historical patterns of disciplinary enforcement, types of complaints brought, and attitudes of disciplinary staff, lawyers, and clients toward the disciplinary process).
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efforts to deal with embezzlement from clients through insurance
and client security fund measures are common, although these
measures are limited and generally insufficient to meet the magnitude of the problem. Finally, the organized profession for the first
time is mounting programs to deal with the serious and continuing
problem of lawyer incompetence caused by substance abuse (alcohol and drugs) or mental illness.
b.

Trust in personal-plight practice

The strongest case for acceptance of the necessity-for-trust
claim in law is the instance of personal-plight practice involving a
client who is indigent, uneducated, and in legal trouble for the first
time. Limited resources impair the client's ability- to gather information, which may be costly; limited education stands in the way
of some forms of client self-help; and lack of pnor exposure to
lawyers and the legal system means that the client lacks the kind
of accumulated on-the-job experience characteristic of some "jailhouse lawyers." In personal-plight situations (e.g., a criminal
charge, a personal injury, or threatened loss of employment or
property) a lay person faces legal "trouble," often for the first time.
An important interest must be placed in the hands of a professional
who is familiar with what the lay person perceives as the intricate
and fearful mysteries of the law Finding a lawyer, putting oneself
in the lawyer's hands, communicating with this strange being-all
of this to the client may be difficult and frightening and involves
an uncomfortable loss of control.5
The asymmetry of information and power in this situation may
justify social efforts to increase the competence of the typical lawyer the client retains and to warrant the trust that is necessarily reposed in this lawyer. At the extreme, if the client is indigent and
the case cannot be pursued on a contingent-fee arrangement, the
client's choice of lawyer is virtually non-existent: The client generally will be stuck with the lawyer that a court or legal services

55. See Robert A. Burt, Conflict and Trins Between Attorney and Client, 69 GEO. LU.
1015 (1981) (arguing that although the legal profession pretends that harmony and trust
are characteristic of the lawyer-client relationship, a degree of fear, suspicion, and distrust
is inevitable in the relationship; lawyers should learn to recognize the problem and deal

with it more openly); see also DOUGLAS E. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN
CHARGE? 96 (1974) (emphasizing the conflict between the lawyer's interest in obtaining a
quick settlement and the client's interest in a larger recovery: "a quick settlement is often
in the lawyer's financial interest, while waiting the insurer out is often in the client's

financial interest").
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office assigns to handle the case.
Even in areas of personal-plight practice, however, the assumption that clients are uninformed, ignorant, and powerless should be
examined rather than taken for granted.56 Some clients may be
able to inform themselves efficiently about needed legal services by
self-help (a variety of published guides are available to assist consumers in most routine legal transactions). Others may get reliable
assistance from voluntary or commercial organizations (consumer
groups, labor umons, etc.). In other important sectors of personalplight representation, institutional representatives or practices may
provide effective assistance in choosing and then supervising a
igh-quality lawyer. In health care, for example, the increased
attention that employers, health insurers, and other third-party payers of medical care give to the selection, price, and quality of
service that is provided by physicians, hospitals, and other healthcare orgamzations generally serves consumer interests.
In the personal-injury field in the United States, the combination of a contingent fee with a referral fee may serve a similar
function of remedying the client's deficiency in information. The
typical scenario is as follows: An injured claimant with a reasonably good case retains, on a contingent-fee basis, a local lawyer
who is not a trial specialist competent to handle the particular
matter. Tins lawyer has an incentive to refer the case to a highly
competent specialist since that will produce the largest return for
both client and lawyer (the referring lawyer generally receives onethird of the one-third contingent fee for serving as a vehicle of
communication with the client and bringing to bear the expert
information on selection. of a lawyer that the client lacks). Although there is state-by-state variation in the extent to which a
referral fee is permitted, the clear movement in American legal
ethics is to allow the referral fee providing the client is informed
and the referring lawyer remains accountable to the client for what

56. See David Luban, Paternalism and the Legal Profession, 1981 Wis. L. REv. 454

(examining the justification for paternalism and their implications in the legal profession);
see also ROSENTHAL, supra note 55 (a study of the relationship between personal injury
clients and their lawyers); Mark Spiegel, Lawyenng and Client Decisionmaking: Informed
Consent and the Legal Profession, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 41 (1979) (proposing a theory of

informed consent which would consider the interests of the client, the lawyer, and society).
57. see PAUL R. STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 441

(1982) (asserting that comprehensive prepayment plans, such as HMOs, have resulted in
cost savings and improvements in efficiency).
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is done. 8
The individual client who seeks relatively routine legal services
may be protected by the emphasis placed on reputation and quality
by law firms and legal clinics specializing in these areas of activity Even though repeat business from the same individual may be
unlikely (e.g., a second divorce), further business is gained by
word-of-mouth spread from former clients and buttressed by the

general reputation for quality that the firm has in the community
The use of trade-name advertising by statewide, regional, or national legal clinics is designed in large part to create the kind of consumer confidence in the quality of the service that retailers such as
Sears attempt to create and maintain in the sale of goods. If the
profession eases (or is forced to ease) present restrictions on form

of practice, the development of national organizations engaged in
delivery of routine legal services to the middle class (e.g., sale of a

house, drafting of a simple will) may reduce the information asymmetry 59 In these and other situations, the free market may operate
reasonably well, although not perfectly
Assumptions about power, authority, and control in the lawyerclient relationship have an important bearing on how doubts on this

58. Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5(e) permits a referrng lawyer and a trial
specialist:
To divide a fee on either the basis of the proportion of services they render or
by agreement between the participating lawyers if all assume responsibility for
the representation as a whole and the client is advised and does not object. It
does not require disclosure to the client of the share that each lawyer is to
receive.

MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUCT Rule 1.5 cmt. 4 (1983). Some ethical pitfalls
in this area are discussed in Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Realities of Referril Fees Here to
Stay, NAT'L L., Nov. 16, 1987, at 13, 13-14.
59. See FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, IMPROVING CONSUMER ACCESS TO LEGAL SERVICES:
THE CASE FOR REMOVING RESTRICTIONS ON TRUTHFUL ADVERTISING (1984) (study concluding that state restrictions on price advertising of five routine legal services resulted in
higher prices; "the dominant effect of advertising is to enhance price competition by lowering consumer search costs"); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., et al., Why Lawyers Should Be
Allowed to Advertise: A Market Analysis of Legal Services, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1084,
1107-09 (1983) (volume advertising of standardizable legal services increases volume and
lowers cost, while providing consumers with useful information; advertising leads consumers to seek more information about service providers); Timothy J. Muns & Fred S.
McChesney, Advertising and the Price and Quality of Legal Services: The Case for Legal
Clinics, 1979 Am. B. FOUND. RES. L 179 (comparing the price and quality of services
offered by an advertising legal clinic and other law firms). The empirical studies are reviewed in Stewart Macauley, Lawyer Advertising: Yes But
, (Institute for Legal Studies Working Paper 7-3, 1985) in LEGAL ETHICS 673-682 (Deborah L. Rhode & David
Luban eds., 1992).
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issue should be resolved. If clients are viewed as generally lacking
in sophistication, unable to identify their own best interests and
incapable of assisting the lawyer in the choice of legal strategies,
then the professional monopoly and extensive lawyer control over
the content of regulation become more justifiable. But the model of
the lawyer-client relationship then tends to become one of a dominant lawyer and a subordinate client.' The lawyer identifies the
client interest that the lawyer is to advance and makes all of the
decisions concerning the means employed to reach this objective.
The danger here is abusive paternalism, in which the lawyer's
convenience and self-interest (1) influence the identification of the
client's objective ("a personal-injury client is only interested in the
amount of recovery"), (2) control the choice of tactical strategies,
and (3) direct the ultimate settlement or trial of the case."1 Professional rules give the lawyer special responsibility for the choice of
tactics;62 and control of the flow of information may allow the
lawyer to influence (if not control) the decision whether or not to
settle.63 Many theorists and some empirical evidence support the
argument that clients, when fully informed, can participate effectively in the handling of their cases and that doing so results in
greater client satisfaction and better results.' In any event, assumptions that are made concerning the client's ability to choose
and evaluate a lawyer are closely related to those made concerning
the client's ability to make decisions during the course of representation.
Perhaps it is relevant here, as in the unauthorized practice field,
that professional claims that harm to clients will flow from any
relaxation of professional prerogatives are made only by lawyers

60. See materials cited supra notes 55-56.
61. See Luban, supra note 56, at 59; ROSmnhAL, supra note 55; William H. Simon,
The Ideology of Advocacy: ProceduralJustice and Professional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. REV.
30, 52-59 (arguing that the expenence and self-interest of lawyers leads them to impute
objectives to clients).
62. See MODEL RuLES OF PRoFEssIoNAL CONDuCT Rule 1.2(a) (1990) ("A lawyer
shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation [with some
exceptions] . . . .and shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to
be pursued
"). "In questions of means" the comment adds, "the lawyer should assume responsibility for techmcal and legal tactical issues, but should defer to the client
regarding such questions as the expense to be incurred and concern for third persons who
might be adversely affected." Id. at cmt. 1.
63. See ROSENTHAL, supra note 55.
64. Id. at 38.41 (clients who participated extensively in their personal-injury cases
obtained better results).
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and not by clients.65 The legal profession repeatedly asserts that,
because clients cannot evaluate what lawyers have to offer, clients
should be protected against their own ignorance. Because of the

tendencies of groups to delude themselves that something that is in
their self-interest is also in the public interest, skepticism is warranted concerning the extent of-the scope of necessity-to-trust argument.

The necessity-for-trust argument also raises difficult, perhaps
unanswerable, questions of what we mean when we talk about
"quality" in legal services.' Clearly, outcomes cannot be the sole
determinant, since in close cases someone must lose-the best
advocacy may be on behalf of a cause that loses or achieves less
than the client hoped. Similarly, efficiency criteria, although important, cannot be the sole arbiter of quality Lawyers, like other

professionals, tend to judge quality in terms of professional notions
involving the intellectual or legal facet of a particular case (the
quality of the advocacy given the state of available legal materials
and arguments);' consumers, on the other hand, give larger

65. See Barlow Christensen, The Unauthorized Practice of Law: Do Good Fences Really Make Good Neighbors-or Even Good Sense?, 1980 Am. B. FOuND. RES. J. 159 (concluding that the legal profession's traditional unauthorized practice position can be explained by two assumptions made by lawyers; either they fear open competition or they
do not believe that the public can make intelligent decisions); Deborah L. Rhode, Policing
the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized
Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1981) (primarily an empirical study of contemporary bar association enforcement of unauthorized practice prohibitions).
66. A major study of the advantages and disadvantages of various methods of providmg legal services to poor persons (e.g., comparing staff attorney systems to judicare approaches utilizing private practitioners) explored relevant factors such as cost, outcomes,
and client satisfaction, but found a direct approach to "quality" very elusive. LEGAL SERvicEs CORP., THE DELIVERY SYSTEMS STUDY: A POLIcY REPORT TO TiE CONGRESS AND
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 126-27 (1980). See Douglas E. Rosenthal,
Evaluating the Competence of Lawyers, i1 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 257 (1976) (discussing
the difficulties of evaluating the competence of lawyers). Deborah L. Rhode, The Rhetoric
of Professional Reform, in THE LEGAL PROFESSION: RESPONSBILI
AND REGULATION
448-50 (Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Deborah L. Rhode eds., 2d ed. 1988), argues that
legal representation is very difficult to evaluate in after-the-fact proceedings, such as professional-discipline or malpractice cases, because of difficulties of proof and uncertainty
about standards. Formal proceedings tend to be limited to cases of egregious conduct. If
after-the-fact assessment is difficult, she argues, prospective screening of lawyers at entry
or thereafter is even more difficult. 'These regulatory problems reintroduce more fundamental questions about the meaning of professionalism
If we can't adequately define it, measure it, screen for it, prepare for it or monitor it, what is the 'it' that justifies
the bar's claims to economc monopoly and regulatory autonomy?" Id. at 504.
67. Studies of the structure of prestige and status in various professions, including law,
suggest that professions value most the complex cognitive tasks in which the special
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weight to other matters when their satisfaction with their lawyers is
measured (e.g., "he didn't return my phone calls"). Lawyers as
well as laymen have difficulty evaluating the quality of legal services. Possible differences m the norms each group would apply in
determuimng quality must also be considered, lest the profession fall
back solely on its own ideas of what is good for clients.

My conclusion is that the necessity-for-trust claim is weaker
than generally supposed. The argument has some continuing justification in some contexts of personal-plight practice, but it does not
provide a strong, across-the-board justification for professional
privileges.

c. Sexual relationship with clients69
A growing body of case law deals with sexual relations between a lawyer and an individual client during the course of representation. In Drucker's Case ° a lawyer was suspended for two
years for sexual relations with a divorce client who suffered from
an anxiety disorder; the court held that the lawyer's conduct violated Model Rule 1.7(b) (conflict with the lawyer's own interests),
Model Rule 1.8(b) (use of client information to disadvantage the

knowledge and skill of the profession is most deeply engaged. That usually means a
"pure" task in which messy human emotions are removed. The specialist who handles
complex problems referred by other specialists is at the top of the prestige structure in all
professions. See Andrew Abbott, Status and Status Strain in the Professions, 86 AM. J.
SOC. 819, 819-25 (1981) (discussing the different statuses that professionals and
nonprofessionals assign to various professions). The "lawyer's lawyer" who deals in specialized regulatory problems for impersonal corporate clients is most highly regarded; the
practitioner dealing with the messy realities of individual divorces is near the bottom
(although the recent increase in complexity in property fights in the divorce field is leading to some reassessment). See also Marvin W. Mindes, Trickster, Hero, Helper: A Report on the Lavyer Image, 1982 AM. B. FOUND. REs. . 177. 211-12 (finding that lawyers believe that clients want a shrewd and aggressive lawyer, while clients want a helpful lawyer).
68. See Barbara A. Curran, Surveying the Legal Needs of the Public: What the Public
Wants and Expects in the Lavyer-Cllent Relationship, in LAW IN A CYNICAL SOCIETY:
OPINION AND LAW IN Tm 1980's 107-19 (Dale Gibson & Janet K. Baldwin eds., 1985)
(discussing empirical studies of client desires). Clients, Curran reports, want a lawyer who
is (1) responsive and committed to them; (2) has integrity; (3) is competent; and (4)
charges a reasonable fee. Clients value most of all a personalized lawyer-client relationship
and measure it by the lawyer's responsiveness to them: "attentiveness, capacity and willingness to communicate, and respect for the client's intelligence and judgment." Id. at
109.
69. See generally John M. O'Connell, Note, Keeping Sex Out of the Attorney.Client
Relationship: A Proposed Rule, 92 CoLUM. L. Ray. 887 (1992) (discussing and proposing
a per se rule banning lawyer-client sexual relationships with limited exceptions).
70. 577 A.2d 1198, 1203 (N.H. 1990).
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client), and Model Rule 1.14(a) (failure to maintain a normal lawyer-client relationship with an impaired client). In re Marriage of
Kantar:' required a hearing of a divorce client's charges that her
lawyer's $15,000 bill for services rendered included time spent in
sexual liaisons. In People v. Gibbons72 a criminal defense lawyer,
who represented both a woman and her husband, initiated a sexual
relationship with the female client; the lawyer, who had also engaged in other misconduct, was disbarred on conflict-of-interest
grounds.
Although the number of reported discipline complaints involving sexual contact is relatively small,73 a low report rate is characteristic of sexual harassment. Studies of psychotherapists' sexual involvement with patients reveal that 12% of psychotherapists nationwide report sexual contact with patients despite a flat professional
prohibition.' Although Arnold Becker, the philandering divorce
lawyer of L.A. Law, may not be typical, accumulating evidence
suggests that sexual relationships between lawyers and divorce
clients occur quite frequently Whenever a client is vulnerable or in
distress, possibilities of manipulation and exploitation abound.
A 1992 ABA ethics opinion reviews the ethics rules that may
be violated by a sexual relationship with an individual client during
the course of representation.' First, the lawyer may breach fiduciary obligations to the client if the sexual relationship results from
the client's dependence and vulnerability or the lawyer's manipulation of the client's trust.7" Second, a lawyer's independent professional judgment may be lost due to sexual involvement with a
client. ' Third, a prohibited conflict with the lawyer's own interest
results if that interest impairs or materially limits the representation.78 Finally, client confidences are protected by the attorneyclient privilege only when communications are made for the purpose of receiving legal advice, imperiling statements made during a
sexual relationship. The opinion advises lawyers to refrain from

71. 581 N.E.2d 6 (Ill. App. CL 1991).
72. 685 P.2d 168, 175 (Colo. 1984).

73. See Linda M. Jorgenson & Pamela K. Sutherland, Lawyer-Client Sexual Contact:
State Bars Polled, NAT'L L.., June 15, 1992, at 26, 26 (only 90 complaints filed in 47
responding states).

74. Id. at 27.
75. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 364 (1992).
76. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.7(b), 1.8(a) & (b), & 1.14(a).
77. See id. at Rule 2.1 (1990).
78. Id. at Rule 1.7(b).
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sexual relationships with clients. If such a relationship occurs and
impairs the lawyer's representation, a disciplinary violation has
occurred.
Many lawyers and legislators argue that requiring a client to
prove that the sexual relationship impaired the lawyer's representation poses too high a burden on the client? 9 Proposals for per se
bans on sexual relationships with individual clients are under consideration in several states. California was the first state thus far to
adopt a rule. As proposed by the state bar, the rule contained a
rebuttable presumption that lawyers who have sexual relations with
clients have provided impaired representation. However, the presumption was removed by the California Supreme Court when it
adopted the rule. As adopted, the rule appears to require little, if
anything, not already required by existing law."0 A subsequent
New York rule bans sexual relations between a matrimonial lawyer
and client.
A per se rule imposing discipline whenever a lawyer has sex
during the course of the professional relationship with an individual
client, at least when the sexual relationship does not preexist the
lawyer-client relationship, has much to be said for it. t Opponents
of a per se rule argue that existing ethics provisions deal satisfactorily with the problem, sexual harassment charges and damage actions against lawyers will be encouraged, and privacy and autonomy interests of lawyers will be impaired. But the constitutional

79. Legislative resolutions in California and Illinois have requested the state supreme
court to adopt a professional rule dealing with lawyer-client sexual relationships. A proposed rule in Oregon was defeated by a close vote of the Oregon state bar in May 1991.
See Don J. DeBenedictis, Sex-With-Client Ban Fails, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1992, at 24.
80. Rule 3-120(B) of the California Rules of Professional Conduct provides that members of the California bar shall not:
(I) Require or demand sexual relations with a client incident to or as a condition of any professional representation; or (2) Employ coercion, intimidation,
or undue influence in entering into sexual relations with a client; or (3) Continue representation of a client with whom the member has sexual relations if
such sexual relations cause the member to perform legal services incompetently
in violation of rule 3-110.
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUcr OF THE STATE BAR OF CAt. Rule 3-120(B) (1993).

81. All of the proposed rules provide exceptions for sexual relationships with spouses
or that preexisted the representation. Some would apply only to non-business clients. The
proposed rules generally would have no application to sexual relationships with agents of
a corporate or organizational client.
82. See Philip Corboy, No: It's Already Covered, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1992, at 35; William
T. Barker & C. Harker Rhodes Jr., Draconian Sex Rules Premature. NAT'L LJ., June 29,
1992, at 17 (arguing the proposed changes are sweeping and harmful).
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right of privacy does not prevent reasonable regulation of lawyer
behavior that generally involves overreaching or abuse of clients
who are to a degree troubled and dependent.3 A prohibition
would not restrict a lawyer's sexual relationships, but only require
that the lawyer withdraw from representation before commencing a
sexual relationship.
B. A Taxonomy of Reform Proposals
A number of studies and surveys reveal that ordinary Amencans encounter legal problems on which a lawyer would be useful
and desired, but the individuals lack the information or means to
pay the full cost of the desired legal services. Is meeting these
unserved needs an important social objective? If so, how might the
unserved needs be met?
Alternative prescriptions for meeting these unserved needs
include: (1) the simplification or modification of legal rules or
processes so that individuals could handle their own problems; (2)
substitution of simpler and cheaper procedures, such as alternative
dispute resolution; (3) increased competition in the provision of
legal or alternative services; and (4) provision of free or reducedfee service either by private practitioners (mandatory pro bono) or
by publicly-funded arrangements.
1. Delegalization and Simplification
The simplification or modification of legal rules or processes
so that individuals could handle their own problems offers the
promise of allowing the solution of problems without the intervention of lawyers or legal proceedings, or in proceedings so simple
that lay people can handle them on their own. This approach, often
referred to as "delegalization," is favored by Derek Bok and other
commentators because it reduces the need for legal intervention by
substituting an alternative regime.
Drastic simplification of transactions or events that now require
the use of lawyers, such as probate of wills, sale of houses, and
divorces, might reduce the need for lawyers for millions of routine
matters. Simpler statutes and regulations written in "plain English"
might more readily be followed without resort to professional ad-

83. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986) (state may regulate sodomy).
But see Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684 (1977) (one aspect of the
"liberty" protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the right to
certain zones of privacy).
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vice. Changes in substantive law would also eliminate the need for
lawyers and lawsuits. An example of such a change is the substitution of national health care for most personal injury and accident
losses. Examples can be multiplied endlessly.
All of these proposals are highly controversial. In each case the
legal profession tends to resist substantive or procedural change,
whether out of concern for the substantive or procedural rights that
would be sacrificed or out of economic self-interest or both. In
each area lawyers opposing change (e.g., probate lawyers opposing
simplified probate or personal injury lawyers opposing no-fault
compensation plans) are joined by powerful economic and social
interests (e.g., insurance companies and health care providers who
oppose health-care and compensation proposals that would affect
their interests).
Delegalization and simplification, in our political culture, are
usually associated with relegating various issues to the private
market. Consumer advocates rightly are disturbed by this alternative
because it leaves the typical consumer at the mercy of those who
have technical knowledge but not a disinterested position. The
alternative approach would be one that relied on public programs
and public administration: government-run programs of national
health care, education, and administrative supervision. The American political climate during the last 25 years, however, has become
unreceptive to publicly-administered programs of social intervention
and we lack traditions of a strong, expert, and politically neutral
civil service to administer them. The choices, therefore, tend to be
limited to reliance on the private market and to subsidized replicas
of that market.
2. Substituting Simpler and Cheaper Procedures (ADR)
A second set of reform proposals seeks to reduce the cost of
legal services and court proceedings by handing them more efficiently. Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) is a favorite proposal.
Frank Sander, for example, proposes extensive use of ADR techniques in a multi-door courtroom, with some official deciding
which technique, or series of techniques, are appropriate for a
M Repetitive and routimzed adjudicatory funcparticular dispute."

84. See Frank E.A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, 70 F.t.D. 111, 130-31
(1976) (arguing for the use of different dispute resolution processes depending on several
factors); see also STEPIEN B. GOUBERG Er AL., DIsPUTE RESOLUTnON (1992); Symposium, Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Law Curriculum, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 229
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tions would be handled by procedures less cumbersome than nor-

mal adjudication. Most cases, even the complex ones, would be
disposed of in arbitration or mediation stages that would precede
the tnal stage. Economies of scale in court-annexed disposition of
disputes provides private and public benefits.

Skeptics respond that the efficiency gains will occur only if the
parties waive constitutional rights or the procedures deal effectively
with intractable procedural dilemmas." Others attack the funda-

mental premises of ADR. Owen Fiss, for example, argues that
social values inherent in judicial declaration of public norms are
sacrificed by substitution of more informal processes of private
settlement."5 Richard Abel and others worry that compulsory ADR
will be confined in practice primarily to poor people, resulting in
second-class justice for those who are already deprived.'a
3.

Increased Competition

Another way to reduce the cost of legal services, favored by a
number of commentators, involves deregulation of the practice of
law 8 Increased competition within the legal profession and with
nonlawyer service providers, it is argued, would lower the cost of
routine legal services and make them more available to the public

at acceptable levels of quality This approach would eliminate the
professional monopoly and the remaining restrictions on form of

(1984) (advocating mediation and negotiation segments within substantive courses).
85. See Paul D. Carrngton, Civil Procedure and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 34 J.
LEGAL EDUc. 298 (1984) (arguing that alternative dispute resolution has three goals:
delegalization of social norms, deprofessionalization of the law, and informalization of
legal .processes, each posing new academic issues in civil procedure).
86. Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
87. Richard Abel, Delegalization: A Critical Review of Its Ideology, Manifestations, and
Social Consequences, in THE LEGAL PROFESSION: RESPONSIBILITY AND REGULATION 388
(Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Deborah L. Rhode eds., 2d ed. 1988); see also JEROLD S.
AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW 9 RESOLVING DISPUTES WITHOUT LAWYERS 115-37
(1983) (discussing the history of the alternative dispute resolution movement).
88. See W. Clark Durant, Maximizing Access to Justice: A Challenge to the Legal
Profession, in LEGAL ETHics 832-40 (Deborah L. Rhode & David Luban eds., 1992).
Durant, then chairman of the board of the Legal Services Corporation, called for replacement of the Corporation by deregulation of the legal profession:
The overall effect of this system created and operated by lawyers is
to limit entry into the profession, to discourage competition, to increase prices,
delays and costs and ultimately to deny access to justice for the poor, for all
of us. The legal cartel's heaviest burden falls on the poor. They are denied
choices and access. They are denied advocates and opportunities.
Id. at 838.
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practice. Nonlawyers would be able to compete with lawyers in the
provision of legal services by delivering services directly to clients
(with a possible exception for representation of criminal defendants) or by employing various combinations of lawyers and
paralegals to perform legal tasks on a high-volume, low-cost basis.
Judge Richard Posner also favors the deregulation of legal education: individuals should be able to sit for bar examinations without
attending accredited law schools, a change that would require law
schools to justify their costs in a free market-costs that now are
built into the cost of legal services."
The role of increased competition in the delivery of legal services is considered in part C, below, with special attention to narrowing the prohibition on unauthorized practice of law and eliminating the current form-of-practice restrictions found in professional
codes.
4. Provision of Free or Reduced-Fee Service
A fourth set of prescriptions is designed to expand the availability of free or subsidized legal services. What can be done to
ensure that people who have legal needs but lack resources can
obtain the services of a competent lawyer? The principal methods
of providing poor people with needed legal services are voluntary
or mandatory pro bono representation by lawyers and publiclyfinanced civil legal assistance. These proposals are considered in
parts D and E, below.
C. More Competitionfrom Within and Without
The advent of lawyer advertising with the Bates decision in
1977' signalled a more competitive environment within the legal
profession. A highly competitive milieu for most sectors of law
practice flows from today's conditions: a large and increasing number of lawyers in all sectors of practice; the decline of legal and
traditional restraints against business-getting; an increasingly aggressive attitude by law firms in attracting new clients and retaining
89. Richard A. Posner, The Uncertain Future of Legal Education, Speech Before the
Association of Amiencan Law Schools' Annual Meeting (Jan. 5, 1991), in NAT'L LJ. Jan.
21, 1991, at 4, 4. Posner stated that legal education "has been distorted and quite possibly distended by state regulation:' Further, "[l]aw schools have a 'captive audience, insulating [them] from a true market test of the value of the services they provide
The
students recognize that they are paying for a credential, rather than for an education."' Id.
90. Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 380-82 (1977) (finding truthful advertisements
about routine legal services are protected commercial speech).
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old ones; and economic incentives that reward business-getting.
Lawyer advertising and solicitation are not considered in detail
at this point because this once controversial area has evolved into a
fairly stable field governed by a few general propositions: First, a
lawyer, subject only to a few exceptions, may solicit business by
any communication that is not misleading or untruthful. Second, inperson solicitation of individuals, especially those in a troubled or
hurt condition, is prohibited if the lawyer's motive is pecumary in
character, but personalized mail solicitation is permissible. Third,
television or other advertising that is symbolic or emotive in character may be subject to somewhat greater regulatory control.9
Competition from within the profession is primarily restricted
today by the state-based system of regulating lawyers. Discussion
of emerging issues in multistate practice, primarily affecting lawyers in the corporate sector, are not considered in this paper. The
assumption here is that the marketplace for legal services to individuals is and will continue to be a highly competitive one. The
pressure today is to relax or to abandon the current restrictions on
non-lawyer providers.
1. Competition from Outside Providers: Scope of
Professional Monopoly
In the United States many tasks of a more or less legal nature
may be undertaken only by a lawyer. Statutes, court rules and
judicial decisions restrict "the practice of law" to lawyers duly
admitted in the jurisdiction. The only general exception to the
professional monopoly of law practice is that persons who are
directly affected may undertake to handle their own legal problems
by arguing their own cases, writing their own wills or copying out
their own deeds-a right of self-representation. 92 The current sta-

91. Stewart Macauley's balanced discussion of the debate as to whether lawyer advertising will undermine professional standards concludes:
Lawyer advertising may play some part in enlarging access to legal services.

Advertising

may push lawyers to work cheaply rather than doing the job

right. However, it is hard to see why advertising will add much to the pres-

sures to cut comers that have long existed. Advertising alone is not likely to
push the bar into crass commercialism or produce a nation of rational informed
clients seeking to maximize utility. Recognizing this, we must be concerned
that largely symbolic debates about lawyer advertising may divert us from
concern with more pressing issues of access and equality.
Macauley, supra note 59, at 682.
92. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835-36 (1975) (crumnal defendant who
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tus and justification of the law of unauthorized practice are examined here.9
Until the 20th century, the doctrine of unauthorized practice of
law meant only that a nonlawyer could not appear in court to
represent another person. Courts enforced the doctrine mainly by
regulating who could enter an appearance in litigation. Outside the
courthouse, nonlawyers freely performed tasks (e.g., title searches
and will drafting) that today would be called the unauthorized
practice of law. A vigorous and expansive doctrine of unauthorized
practice can be seen in incipient form by the turn of the century
but did not fully appear upon the American scene until sometime
after the First World War. During the Depression, economic pressures on the bar and a social environment that was more hospitable
to occupational licensing led to more vigorous enforcement of the
expanded doctrine by unauthorized practice committees in virtually
every state. During this period, the present scope of unauthorized
practice became embodied in judicial decisions that also state the
modem rationale of the doctrine: protection of consumers from
their own ignorance.
After judicial decisions had established broad parameters of
unauthorized practice, the organized bar, beginning in the 1930s,
negotiated treaties with organized groups of competitors that had
the effect of dividing the market for services in areas reserved for
lawyers, on the one hand, and accountants, architects, claims adjusters, collection agencies, liability insurance companies, lawbook
publishers, professional engineers, realtors, title companies, trust
companies, and social workers, on the other. The growth of the
consumer movement and the evolution of federal antitrust law
brought an end to this market division strategy The Goldfarb
decision in 1975.' striking down the bar's suggested minimum
fee schedules on federal antitrust law grounds, made it clear that
anticompetitive activity by bar associations was subject to the federal antitrust laws. Subsequently, lower court decisions and the
initiation of a federal challenge led to retrenchment and reorganzamade a "knowing and intelligent" waiver of the constitutional right to the assistance of
counsel had a constitutional nght to self-representation).
93. The best general accounts of the bar's attempts to suppress unauthorized practice of
law are Christensen, supra note 65 (tracing the development of the unauthorized practice
of law in the United States and recurrent challenges arising from it) and Rhode, supra
note 65 (primarily an empirical study of contemporary bar association enforcement practice).
94. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 793 (1975).
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tion of unauthorized practice activity The mterprofessional treaties
were abandoned because of fears of antitrust liability, a number of
states disbanded their unauthorized practice committees, and, in
other states, activity was narrowed and channeled through the state
supreme court. The statutory and common-law prohibitions against
unauthorized practice, however, continue in force.
Lay assistance in the provision of routine legal services (e.g.,
divorces, wills, and consumer bankruptcies) has been a major field
of contest during recent decades. Earlier efforts to restrict the availability of self-help materials to members of the public foundered
on first amendment grounds. The battle ground then shifted to lay
assistance in filling out and filing legal forms, as in the
Brumbaugh95 and Furman95 cases in Florida.
Defining the activities which constitute the "practice of law," if
the term is not limited to representation in formal proceedings
before courts of general jurisdiction, quickly becomes a broad issue
of public policy- What activities carried on by lawyers should be
protected against outside competition? Court decisions use ad hoc
circular reasoning in defining "the practice of law." The most
common formulation is the "professional judgment" test: Is the
activity one in which a lawyer's presumed special training and
skills are relevant?' A matter has legal ramifications requiring a
lawyer's
involvement
8 Theonly when it involves "difficult or doubtful
Alegal questions.""
actual boundaries, however, appear to be
more responsive to political and econonue realities than to efforts
at principled line-drawing under these vague tests.99

95. Florida Bar v. Brumbaugh, 355 So. 2d 1186, 1194 (Fla. 1978) (holding that a lay
secretarial service could provide divorce forms but not assist customers in filling them
out).
96. Fonda Bar v. Furman, 451 So. 2d 808, 815 (Fla. 1984) (finding contempt for violation of court order barring a former legal secretary from providing oral advice in connection with provision of divorce forms to persons seeking an uncontested divorce). The
Furman case is discussed in RHODE & LUBAN, supra note 13, at 734-38.

97. EC 3-5 of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, after stating that "[i]t is
neither necessary nor desirable to attempt the formulation of a single, specific definition
of what constitutes the practice of law," then provides a functional (but circular) definition: it is the "practice of law" when the "professional judgment of a lawyer" is called
for in relating "the general body and philosophy of law to a specific legal problem of a
client." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 3-5 (1969). The context suggests that this determunation is to be made in the light of public interest considerations,
i.e., the sphere of exclusion is to be deterrmned by the purposes to be served.
98. Agran v. Shapiro, 273 P.2d 619, 626 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1954); Gardner
v. Conway, 48 N.W.2d 788, 796 (Minn. 1951).
99. Potential clients, particularly those of lower and middle socio-economic status, fear
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The location of the boundaries is the product of the ebb and
flow of interaction between the organized bar and competing service-providers, state law as formulated by state courts, constitutional law as formulated by the Supreme Court, inter-professional
detente, and market forces. In Florida and Colorado, for example,
the bar associations have been fairly aggressive, whereas in other
jurisdictions they have been nearly dormant or, as in California,
active but on the defensive. In general, state courts act only in
response to bar association initiatives. When state courts have been
asked to suppress activity as unauthorized practice of law, they
have in general sided with the bar's position.
Professor Deborah Rhode and some other commentators argue
that the current enforcement of unauthorized practice restrictions
raises significant due process and First Amendment questions."
The prohibition, she argues, is unduly vague and threatens in an
overbroad fashion self-representation' and other first amendment
interests. To date, the Supreme Court has rejected these claims.' 1
In the typical injunction proceeding, the vagueness problem is reduced because the initial order is one that enjoins specific behavior. The injunctive remedy also deprives the nonlawyer of a lay
jury that might be more sympathetic than a lawyer-judge to lay
competition.
Representation of parties in litigation in courts of general junsdiction is the strongest case for the lawyer's professional monopo-,.
ly. An unbroken tradition, flowing from the exclusive right of the
English barrister to represent parties in high courts, is backed by
functional arguments. The intricacies of court procedure and trial
tactics, essential to protect clients from serious harm, suggest the
desirability of confining representation to skilled advocates. The
settlement and disposition of cases in an orderly and efficient manner is facilitated when a relatively small group of professional
representatives deal with judges and each other on a regular basis.

lawyers and are quite unsure how to deal with them. That fear may have been why lay
services, such as those of Brumbaugh and Furman, appeal to their customers. Any resolution of unauthorized-practice issues should take that possibility into account.
100. Rhode, supra note 65. at 48-74 (analyzing the enforcement of the unauthonzed
practice of law).

101. See Furman v. Florida Bar, 444 U.S. 1061 (1980). In Furman, the Court dismissed
an appeal in a divorce-advice case for want of a substantial federal question despite the
contention that such result violated First Amendment rights to disseminate and receive information. The commercial speech doctrine, however, does protect distribution of self-help
materials.
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In short, efficiency and justice concerns support the professional
monopoly in the litigation context.
The possibility of permitting anyone to represent another
before a tribunal poses more difficulties than does permitting anyone to draft a document. The hypothesized, deliberate choice by a client of a nonlawyer for advice whether to
sign a lease may result in economic loss to the client
through improper counseling, but in most instances, it will
be a loss to the client alone. However, the choice of one
not trained to appear before a tribunal involves costs that
must be borne by others-costs to the tribunal itself and to
the other litigants. At a time when many are calling for a
specialized trial bar because of allegedly inadequate lawyer
performance, a move in the opposite direction to permit
anyone to try cases for others seems of dubious viabili02
ty 1
Even in the adjudicatory realm, however, statutes or custom
carve out some exceptions for lower tribunals (e.g., justice of the
peace courts, small claims courts) or for some administrative tribunals. In most of these situations, the losing party is entitled to a de
novo trial or further hearing before a constitutional court, in which
nonlawyers will be forbidden from appearing on behalf of others.
Representation before tribunals has been an area of lively contest
between interests such as consumer groups and lawyers. State statutes or agency rules that have attempted to broaden the power of
nonlawyers to represent others in agency proceedings have been
struck down as a violation of the exclusive, inherent power of the
state's highest court to regulate the practice of law 103 The integrity of "judicial power," however, is not really threatened by legislative choices of this type.
The American law of unauthorized practice goes well beyond
that of the remainder of the common-law world in extending the
prohibition to out-of-court legal services. Because law is such an

102. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93D CONG., 2D SESS., REDUCING THE COSTS
OF LEGAL SERVICES: POSSIBLE APPROACHES BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (Comm.
Print 1974) (Thomas Ehrlich & Murray L. Schwartz) (exploring ways to reduce costs of
legal services and focusing on the relationship between training persons providing legal
services and the costs of such training).
103. See, e.g., Idaho State Bar Ass'n v. Idaho Pub. Util. Comm'n, 637 P.2d 1168, 1173
(Idaho 1981) (agency rule authorizing representation in utility commission proceedings by
nonlawyer representatives of consumer groups and trade associations held invalid).
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omnipresent reality in today's world, it is impossible for individuals in hundreds of endeavors to carry on their work without dealing with "the law." Consider the police officer patrolling a neighborhood beat, the small business filing its tax return, the buyer or
seller of a residential home, the consumer dealing with an aggressive finance company or collection agency, or the spouse considerng a no-fault divorce. Each of these individuals may consult a

lawyer, but many of them may seek or get advice from
nonlawyers: The police officer from a nonlawyer supervisor, the
small business from an accountant, the home buyer from a realtor,
the consumer from a consumer group, and the spouse from a selfhelp kit or a Rosemary Furman.

The current law of unauthorized practice goes too far m seeking to protect consumers from competitive services provided by
nonlawyers. Consumer groups and ratings can guide consumers in
choosing services. Malpractice liability is likely to provide greater
protection than professional controls applied to lawyers. The organized bar, while claiming that consumers must be protected from
their own inability to judge the quality of the services offered, fails
to provide assurance that the lawyers whom consumers will otherwise be required to consult have the necessary competence and
integrity. The higher costs of limiting service to lawyers means that
consumers forego any assistance for many ordinary, but troublesome problems.
The orgamzed bar largely acquiesces in activities carried on by
powerful occupational groups, such as accountants in providing tax
advice or realtors in real estate transactions. The bar's efforts to
enforce unauthorized practice restrictions are strongest in situations
in winch unorgamzed individuals, such as Rosemary Furman, seek
to perform activities that are of considerable economic importance
to general practitioners, such as divorces, personal bankruptcies,
and probate of wills. These activities involve legal complexity
similar in range to those carried on by accountants or realtors. The
only major difference between tax advice or real estate transactions
is that simple divorces, bankruptcies, and probate involve court
filings, however routine in character.
Jerome Carlin's empirical study of solo practitioners in Chicago
concluded:
Most matters that reach the individual practitioner-the
small residential closing, the simple uncontested divorce,
drawing up a will or probating a small estate, routine fil-
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ings for a small business, negotiating a personal injury
claim, or collecting on a debt--do not require very much
technical knowledge, and what techmcal problems there are
generally simplified by the use of standardized forms and
procedures
[Moreover, clients in these areas are]
unwilling to pay for the kind of legal advice or product
that would give fullest rein to the individual practitioner's
abilities. As a result, the legal work of the individual lawyer is, in most instances, reduced to a fairly routine, clerical-bookkeeping job-the very kind of job which many
nonlawyers and lay organizations are as well, if not better,
equipped to handle than the lawyer.
[M]uch of tis
work should probably be handled by lay organizations. This
does not necessarily mean eliminating the lawyer, but, as in
the case of the title company, transferring the job from the
private lawyer to the house counsel [assisted by clerks and
paralegals]."
On the other hand, Professors Ehrlich and Schwartz argue that
these conclusions rest on supposition rather than solid evidence.
They ask for studies that will show, for example, whether the
displacement of the solo lawyer by title insurance companies is
more efficient, or merely the substitution of a new and more costly
monopoly (e.g., that of title insurance companies) for that of lawyers. They urge studies that would "indicate the relative costs and
benefits of lawyer and nonlawyer representation, and a comparison
of lawyer costs for services in fields where 'lay' competition is not

permitted
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Professor Rhode's comprehensive study of the enforcement of
unauthorized practice regulation concludes that the burden of proof
and persuasion rests on the legal profession to justify its monopoly,
rather than on actual or potential competitors:

104. JEROME

E. CARLIN,

LAWYERS

ON

THEIR

OWN:

A

STUDY

OF INDIVIDUAL

PRACTITIONERS IN CHICAGO 206-09 (1962).
105. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93D CONG.. 2D SESS., supra note 102, at 305.

106. Rhode, supra note 65. at 94-99. Rhode's empirical study finds the following: Prosecutors rarely bring criminal charges of unauthorized practice; nearly all complaints emanate from the organized bar rather than from consumers of legal services; the bar's enforcement efforts primarily take the less visible forms of pressure, negotiation, and threat,
followed occasionally by injunction proceedings against recalcitrant competitors; and the
bulk of the enforcement effort (three.quarters of all investigations and 68% of reported
cases) involves lay form preparation and related advice.
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Invoking standards that are conclusory, circular, or both,
courts have typically inquired only whether challenged
activity calls for "legal" skills, not whether lay practitioners
in fact possess them. At every level of enforcement, the
consumer's need for protection has been proclaimed rather
than proven ....
...

Absent evidence of significant injuries resulting

from lay assistance, individuals should be entitled to determine the cost and quality of legal services that best meet
their needs. Where there are demonstrable grounds for
paternalism, it should emanate from institutions other than
the organized bar [which has such a strong self-interest in
a broad sphere of professional monopoly].i e
2. Competition from Legal Assistants and Paralegals
Many law firms operate a high volume practice in such matters
as divorce, real estate closings, workers' compensation claims, and
bankruptcy 103 In these firms, and in legal services organizations
representing the poor, intake and basic work is done by paralegals,
with lawyers involved only as necessary. Nonlawyer competitors of
lawyers frequently complain that law firms engaged in the same
activities do so with extensive use of nonlawyers (legal secretaries,
legal assistants and paralegals) who are given very limited supervision by lawyers. The bar's response is that professional codes
require supervision and make the supervising lawyer responsible for
an employee's breach of fiduciary or other obligations."
The dramatic growth in the use of legal assistants and paralegals in recent decades has suggested to some that these individuals should be licensed by the state after demonstration of competence through education, examnation, or other credentialing. The

107. Id. at 97-99.
108. See THE SOcrAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF LAWYERS: CASE STUDIES 258 (Philip B.
Heyman & Lance Liebman eds., 1988) (detailing Raul Lovett's workers' compensation and
personal injury practice). A description of the high-volume practice of a legal clinic relying on extensive advertising is also included in the same volume. Id. at 49.
109. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcT Rule 5.3 (1990); MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsmiiITY EC 3-6 (1983). The Comment to M.R. 5.3 states: "Lawyers
generally employ assistants in their practice, including secretaries, investigators, law student
interns, and paraprofessionals. Such assistants, whether employees or independent contractors, act for the lawyer in rendition of the lawyer's professional services."
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ABA has developed standards for legal assistant training programs
and accredits particular programs as complying with its standards.
A few states have developed licensing programs that are related to
bar admission activities. Is it desirable to extend credentialing into
this area? Should these developments be under the control of the
legal profession or independent from the bar9 The issues are not
dissimilar to those involving the relationship of physicians to other
health care occupations, such as nursing.
The most controversial aspect of the 1986 report of the ABA
Commission on Professionalism was some language dealing with
paraprofessional competition under the innocuous heading that
lawyers should "[e]neourage innovative methods which simplify
and make less expensive the rendering of legal services."'1' Lawyers, the report stated, "should have to compete with properly
licensed paraprofessionals" in "certain real estate closings, the
drafting of simple wills, and selected tax services" if "clients of
ordinary means are to be served at all." ' '
The report further stated that "it can no longer be claimed that
lawyers have the exclusive possession of the esoteric knowledge
required and are therefore the only ones able to advise clients on
any matter concerning the law . . Lawyer resistance to [inroads
on lawyer exclusivity] for selfish reasons only brings discredit on
the profession."". These sentences in the Commission's report
provoked a violent, critical reaction from lawyers and local bar
groups. In California, however, where lay persons have been actively engaged in providing services in a number of these areas,
the bar is studying the possibility of licensing these paralegal activities.'
3.

Form-of-Practice Restrictions

Model Rule 5.4 forbids a lawyer to "form a partnership with a
nonlawyer if any of the activities of the partnership consist of the
practice of law," forbids a lawyer to "share legal fees with a nonlawyer," and states that a "lawyer shall not practice with or in the
if
. a
form of a professional corporation or association

110. ABA Comm'n on Professionalism,"

In the Spirit of Public Service", A

Blueprint for the Rekindling of Lawyer Professionalism, 112 F.R.D. 243, 301 (1986).
I11. Id.
112. Id.
113. See Deborah L. Rhode, The Delivery of Legal Services by Non-lawyers, 4 GEO. L
LEGAL ETHics 209, 222-28 (1990) (discussing the Californa situation).
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nonlawyer owns any interest therein

575

. ., a nonlawyer is a corpo-

rate director or officer thereof; or. . a nonlawyer has the right to
direct or control the professional judgment of a lawyer."' n4 The
Comment states that "[t]hese limitations are to protect the lawyer's
professional independence of judgment... 5
Should nonlawyers be prohibited from investing in, managing,
and profiting from companies that provide legal services? Critics of
form-of-practice restrictions argue that the legal services market
would benefit from enlarged competition and increased investt Allowing accounting firms, banks, insurance
ment. 15
companies,
or retailers to diversify into legal services would serve that purpose. On the other hand, especially when legal services are combined with another business activity, such as the provision of banking or insurance services, legal advice may be distorted by the
desire to sell these other services. The policy question is whether
professional discipline or malpractice exposure of lawyer and nonlawyer participants who violated professional standards (e.g., breach
of confidentiality or conflict of interest) would provide sufficient
protection to consumers of service providers owned or managed by
non-lawyers.
Restrictions on the ownership and management of organizations
providing legal services to the public have important implications
for the cost, variety, and availability of legal services to middleclass Americans. For a time, the orgaized bar strongly opposed
any group legal service arrangements on the grounds that impermissible solicitation was involved. When court decisions required
abandonment of this position," 7 the bar retreated to rules requir114. MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCt Rule 5A(a), (b) & (d)(1990).
115. Id. at Rule 5.4 cmt. The provisions of M.R. 5.4 are drawn from, and substantially
replicate, DR 3-102(A). DR 3-103(A) and DR 5-107(C) of the Model Code, and may be
traced back to Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Etlucs.
116. For criticism of M.R. 5.4, see Stephen Gillers, What We Talked About When We
Talked About Ethics: A Critical Vieiv of the Model Rules, 46 OHIO ST. LJ. 243, 266-69
(1985). Gillers argues that M.R. 5.4 serves the interests of established firms, with accumulated capital and clientele, rather than the interests of lawyers generally, especially younger
lawyers who would benefit from increased opportunities m salaried employment; it also
harms consumers by suppressing competition in the supply of services.
117. See United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576, 585 (1971) ("he
common thread running through our decisions in NAACP v. Button, Trainmen, and United
Mine Workers is that collective activity undertaken to obtain meaningful access to the
courts is a fundamental right within the protection of the First Amendment.:); Brotherhood
of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Va. State Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 8 (1964) ("The First and
Fourteenth Amendments protect the right of the members through their Brotherhood to
maintain and carry out their plan for advising workers who are injured to obtain legal
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ing "open panels" and lawyer control. Again forced to retreat from

this position, the professibn became more hospitable to group legal
service plans"' but steadfastly opposed relaxation of requirements

that organizations delivering legal services be limited in ownership
and control to members of the bar."9 The specter of national re-

tailers, insurance companies and major banks, among others, offering legal services generally, or to their customers through multiple

offices, continues to alarm the profession. Form-of-practice restrictions, such as those embodied in Model Rule 5.4, are the profession's barrier to these forms of competition.

Provision of legal services by organizations owned or managed
by non-lawyers presents a variety of standard professional responsibility problems. The lawyers who actually perform the legal work
generally are selected or employed by the organizers of the plan.

Will the independent judgment of the lawyer in serving a client

advice and for recommending specific lawyers
And, of course, lawyers accepting
employment under this constitutionally protected plan have a like protection which the
State cannot abridge"); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 444-45 (1963) (holding that the
First Amendment protects the NAACP's right to seek plaintiffs and provide them with
counsel; state's interest in preventing barratry, maintenance and champerty is not a compelling state interest justifying limiting First Amendment freedoms).
118. In general, as with lawyer advertising, the ABA and state bar associations have
attempted to prohibit or restrict arrangements for group legal services, while the Supreme
Court has forced the bar to accommodate them. Yet, the profession has not been
monolithic in opposition-important elements of ABA leadership have seen group legal
services as a vital part of the long-term future of the legal profession because of their
potential role in expanding the demand for legal services. Despite bar opposition, group
and prepaid plans grew rapidly, reaching an estimated 15 million Americans by the nud1980s. Emily Counc, Guardian Angels' of the Law: Prepaid Legal Services Take Wing,
NAT'L LJ., Nov. 17, 1986, at 1, 1. Much of the growth was due to the recognition of
lawyer advertising, beginning with the Bates decision in 1977, and changes in federal law
that made group and prepaid plans attractive as an employment-related fringe benefit.
119. For discussion of the ABA's grudging response to the constitutional decisions requiring recognition of group legal services plans, see WOLFRAM, supra note 47, § 16.5.5.
The 1969 Model Code limited lawyer participation in group legal service plans to those
operated by a nonprofit organization that used "open panels" of lawyers (under an "open
panel" a plan member is entitled to choose a lawyer from the private bar, under a
"closed panel," a member is restricted to a staff lawyer or a group of lawyers selected by
the plan). Wolfram states that a 1974 amendment to DR 2-103 "seemed to place the
ABA Code at odds with the Supreme Court's earlier decision, in 1967, in United Mine
Workers v. Illinois State Bar, [389 U.S. 217 (1967)] in which the Court had held that
states were required to permit unions to offer closed-panel representation to members who
wished to litigate worker compensation claims." Id. § 16.5, at 913. Wolfram concludes
that the "[gleneral hostility to group legal service plans [that] bristles through the technical language of the amended Code
is difficult to comprehend except as arising from
parochial economic interests of lawyers who might be put at a competitive disadvantage
by group legal service plans." Id. § 16.5 at 915.
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through the plan be distorted or controlled by the interests of the
operator of the plan? The same possibilities are present whenever a
third person selects and pays a client's lawyer (e.g., a liability
insurer providing a defense to an insured) or whenever an orgamzation hires staff lawyers (e.g., corporate legal staff). Second, group
legal services plans often rely on advertising, raising the same
issues involved in other advertising of legal services. Should an
insurance company be permitted to call or solicit members of the
public to enroll in a prepaid legal services plan in the same manner in which those companies merchandise life and health insurance to the public? Third, many plans employ nonlawyers to administer plans and to perform paralegal functions. Use of non-lawyer staff may constitute the unauthorized practice of law
Underlying all of these issues is one of competition with general practitioners in the provision of legal services to ordinary Americans. Hostility to group legal services comes primarily from bar
leaders representing the interests of general practitioners who are
the lawyers primarily threatened by competition from group legal
services plans (e.g., the loss of work-injury cases handled by a
union plan).
The Kutak Commission's draft of what became Model Rule 5.4
eliminated the form-of-practice requirements restricting group legal
services. Under the proposal, a lawyer could be employed by any
organization engaged in the delivery of legal services as long as
the orgamzation respected a lawyer's professional judgment, protected client confidential information, avoided impermssible advertising or solicitation, and charged only fees reasonable in amount.
The Commission's proposal, however, was dropped from the Model
Rules by the ABA House of Delegates at the last minute. Professor
Geoffrey Hazard, the reporter for the Kutak Commission, reports:
someone asked if [the Kutaki proposal
"During the debate
When they found
would allow Sears Roebuck to open a law office.
1 20
out it would, that was the end of the debate."
Model Rule 5.4 (and its Model Code antecedents) assumes that
lay managers of a legal services organization will be tempted, more
than are lawyer managers, to interfere with the professional relationships of employed lawyers when it is profitable to do so and
that the problem is so serious that a prophylactic rule prohibiting
lay management is necessary. These assumptions are questionable

120. David Kaplan, Want to Invest in a Law Finn?. NAT'L L., Jan. 19, 1987, at 28.
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at best. After-the-fact remedies for violation of professional standards (e.g., discipline, malpractice liability, and court sanctions)
will provide sufficient protection to consumers.
D. Mandatory Pro Bono
This section and the one that follows consider the role of mandatory pro bono and publicly-funded legal assistance in meeting the
unmet needs of ordinary Americans, especially poor people.
What is the scope of the problem? No one knows the proportion -of the legal needs of the poor that are now going unmet. The
federally-funded national legal services program meets a portion of
the need, although funding cuts since 1981 have reduced the program from over 6000 total lawyers to about 4000 nationwide.
Efforts to encourage and support private bar involvement in local
legal services programs have met with some success. Various studies show that most lawyers do participate in some pro bono work,
but much of that time is directed toward activities that build relations with other lawyers, such as bar association work, or work
that is designed to attract clients, such as free or reduced-fee work
for local charities.' 2 t
Poor people have many needs and the pursuit of legal claims
with the help of lawyers may be less important than other needs,
such as housing, education, and employment. Social resources are
finite and other programs and benefits for poor people compete
with the provision of lawyers. Moreover, legal services are different from other professional services in two respects: First, because
equality in their provision is important (the adversary system operates best when both parties have advocates of equal skill and resources), it is argued that poor or limited services carry some
negatives and limited benefits." Second, the availability to one
party of subsidized legal services imposes costs on other persons,

121. Although most lawyers donate some free services, little of it involves the representation of indigents. Jim Miskiewicz, Mandatory Pro Bono Won't Disappear,NAT'L L.J.,
Mar. 23, 1987. at 1. Some reports indicate that as many as 16 percent of lawyers participate in pro bono services for the poor, but other studies report that only about 6 percent
of lawyer time is pro bono, much of it devoted to charities rather than poor people. See
the materials cited in Roger C. Cramton, Mandatory Pro Bono, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV.

1113, 1121, 1124 (1991) (citing materials indicating the amount of pro bono work which
lawyers do).
122. Richard Abel, Legal Services, in THE LEGAL PROFESSION: RESPONSIBILITY AND
REGULATION 417, 417 (Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., & Deborah L. Rhode eds., 2d ed., 1988)
(Unlike health care and other services, "the services of a lawyer are valuable only if they
are roughly equal, in quality and quantity, to the services possessed by adversaries").
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who are forced to hire lawyers to defend their interests, and on the
public.
If all needs cannot be met because of either cost or substantive
deficiency, who should decide what needs will be met? In Europe,
where a right to civil legal assistance is generally recognized, its
actual provision is restricted by mechamsms designed to screen out
nonmeritonous claims and by severe restrictions on the fees lawin handling matters that survive the screening proyers earn
3

cess.'1

If some specific needs should be met, perhaps because they
enable poor people to take control over their own lives, does it
follow that law, lawyers, and litigation are the best or most desirable approach?
1. A Constitutional Right to Civil Legal Assistance?
After the Warren Court held in the Gideon case that due process "cannot be realized if the poor man charged with crime has to
face his accusers without a lawyer to assist him,"'24 it seemed
possible that a similar right might be recognized for civil matters.
The high water mark of this development was Boddie v. Connecticut,"s in which the Court, on due process grounds, struck down a
state statute requiring prepayment of a $45 filing fee by divorce
plaintiffs. Boddie was subsequently narrowed to situations where
judicial process provided the only means for vindicating a fundamental interest" and was then displaced by a balancing-of-factors
approach in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services.127
In Lassiter the Court held that a state's failure to appoint counsel for an indigent, imprisoned mother, before terminating her
parental rights to custody of her minor child as an unfit parent, did
not violate due process." The Court's three-part balancing process, carred over from other due process cases, considers (1) the

123. See Earl Johnson, Jr., The Right to Counsel in Civil Cases: An InternationalPerspective, 19 Loy. LA. L. REv. 341, 341-55 (1985) (comparative study of the nght to
civil legal assistance in Europe).
124. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).

125. 401 U.S. 371, 382-83 (1971).
126. See Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 661 (1973) (upholding a $25 filing fee to
obtain state court appellate review of a state agency's reduction of welfare benefits); United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 446 (1973) (holding that bankruptcy is not a fundamental interest).
127. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
128. Id. at 33-34.
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private interests at stake, (2) the government's interests, and (3) the
extent of the risk that the claimed procedural right, here the absence of publicly-provided counsel, will lead to erroneous results in
the litigation." 9 Four dissenting justices asserted that termination
of parental rights involves a more important interest than is involved in many misdemeanor cases.' 30 They also argued that appointment of counsel is particularly important for a fair adjudication of cases of tins type, which involve the application of an
imprecise standard in formal adversarial proceedings in which the
opposing party, the state, is represented.' 3' As the dissenters predicted, few situations under Lassiter's balancing-of-interests approach turn out to require the appointment of counsel in civil
cases.' States are free to provide counsel to indigents in civil
cases, either generally or in specific categories of cases, but with
33
limited exceptions, have not done so.1
David Luban argues that the premises of the American political
system require the provision of counsel to indigents in important
civil matters, and especially in civil enforcement proceedings
against a poor person." Equality before the law is a fundamental
principle embodied in constitutional text. Its effective implementa,tion requires access to the legal system, which in turn is dependent
upon the assistance of lawyers. In Luban's view, the failure to provide counsel impairs the legitimacy of government.
Geoffrey Hazard states some of the reasons why "[t]he notion
that due process meant lawyer-assisted process never took hold in
civil matters:"'35

129. Id.
130. Id. at 35-60 (Blackmun, J.,& Stevens, J.,dissenting).
131. Id.
132. See United States v. Bobart Travel Agency, 699 F.2d 618, 620-21 (2d Cir. 1983)
(requiring the appointment of counsel for civil contempt charges that may lead to imprisonment); Salas v. Cortez, 593 P.2d 226, 239 (Cal.) (employing Lassiter's balancing

approach and holding that a man defending a paternity charge is entitled to appointed
counsel), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 900 (1979).
133. In Payne v. Superior Court, 553 P.2d 565, 573 (Cal. 1976), a prisoner seeking to
defend a civil action was held entitled to appointed counsel. Payne was reaffirmed in
Yarbrough v. Superior Court, 702 P.2d 583, 589 (Cal. 1985) (expressing a hope that the

legislature would provide funding for representation that otherwise depended on appointed
counsel serving without compensation).
134. See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 237-66 (19 '8)
(arguing that equality-of-nghts.not-fortunes is a basic legitimation right of society and its
demal undermines the legitimacy of the system and may generate a right of resistance).
135. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., After Professional Virtue, 1989 Sup. Cr. REV. 213, 219.
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For one thing, there was a long tradition, exemplified in
workman's compensation proceedings, juvenile court, and
small claims, that legal dispute resolution could be more
just, more expeditious and less expensive if lawyers were
kept out. For another thing, in civil cases there was no
apparatus of legal assistance provided by the state to assist
one side, as was provided for the prosecution in criminal
cases.
There was a more fundamental difficulty in fixing the
provision of civil legal aid. The measure of necessary legal
aid in criminal cases was the quantum provided the prosecution. There was no similar measure for civil legal aid. To
provide a lawyer to an indigent civil grievant was in effect
to confer a subsidy in the amount of nuisance settlement
value to beneficiaries arbitrarily selected in terms of income
or wealth and self-selecting in terms of disposition to litigate. Implicitly recognizing this, the courts were willing to
say that due process required legal aid only in narrowly
limited civil categories. In other civil matters, provision of
legal aid would have to remain dependent on someone's
exercise of discretion to calibrate demand with supply. 36
In the absence of any constitutional entitlement, provision of
counsel to indigents in civil matters depends upon the volunteered
services of lawyers, judicial actions appointing lawyers for
indigents, and legislative provision of subsidized legal services.
2. Professional Obligation to Represent Poor People
The bar has long recognized some kind of an obligation on the
part of its members to represent persons who need legal services
but cannot afford them. Various rationales are offered. One is that
a lawyer, as an officer of the court, has a concern that justice be
done, and that representing an indigent person who requires legal
assistance is an obvious way to act upon this concern. Another
rationale is that the bar has a monopoly of law practice, and as a
monopolist, it should reallocate some of its monopoly profits to a
manifest public need that is related to the monopoly A third rationale is that representation of the poor is a special kind of continuing legal education that exposes the lawyer to the realities of jus-

136. rd. at 219-20.
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tice as administered to the poor. 37
Volunteered services may have worked reasonably well in

small-town America at an earlier time. Lawyers were general practitioners who had contacts with a wide range of people in their
communities. A poor person who came to a lawyer's office with a
substantial and meritorious legal problem may have had a decent
chance of getting necessary help. A competent general practitioner
could tell a meritorious case when he saw it, especially if he was
free to decline it. Toward the end of the 19th century, the face-to-

face character of American society gave way in urban centers. During the 20th century, legal practice became increasingly specialized
in character. Absent institutional arrangements channeling willing
lawyers to needy clients, volunteered efforts proved ineffective.
Lawyers have embodied their aspirations concermng access to
justice in their codes of professional ethics, but have not stated

them in mandatory terms. 3 The wording of Model Rule 6.1 reflects an explicit rejection of earlier drafts which mandated 40
hours per year of pro bono service from each lawyer. A February
1993 amendment to the ABA's recommended Model Rule 6.1

moves in the direction of specificity by urging 50 hours per year
of pro bono service, primarily in a form benefiting poor people.
Mandatory pro bono proposals have arisen in states and localities
with increasing frequency since the 1980s, partly stimulated by
cutbacks in federal funding of the Legal Services Corporation.
Thus far, state-wide proposals have been defeated or tabled after
39
extensive discussion.1

137. For discussions of the "pro bono" obligation see Barlow F. Christensen, The
Lawyer's Pro Bono Publico Responsibility, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1 (discussing the
origin and continuing existence of the lawyer's pro bono responsibility); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Laisyer's Pro Bono Obligation, 1981 A.B.A. PROC. 2D NAT'L CONF. ON
LEGAL SERVICES & THE PUBLIC 100 (discussing whether lawyers should have a legal duty
to perform pro bono work); David L. Shapiro, The Enigma of the Lawyer's Duty to
Serve, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 735 (1980) (analyzing the history of the lawyer's public service
requirement, and exploring economic and policy objections to the imposition of an enforceable service obligation).
138. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 6.1 & cmt. (1990); MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-25, 8-3, & 8-9 (1983).
139. For discussion of mandatory pro bono proposals, see LUBAN, supra note 134, at
240-89 (1988); Michael Millemann, Mandatory Pro Bono in Civil Cases: A Partial Answer to the Right Question. 49 MD. L. REV. 18 (1990) (analyzing the history of mandatory pro bono, proposing mandatory pro bono in the United States, and analyzing objections
to mandatory pro bono); Steven B. Rosenfeld, Mandatory Pro Bono: Historical and Constitutional Perspectives, 2 CARDOZO L. REV. 255 (1981) (reacting to the ABA's inclusion
of mandatory pro bono in the discussion draft of the Model Rules of Professional Con-
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Because supporters and critics of mandatory pro bono often
agree on overall objectives, yet disagree vehemently about the
details of implementation, consideration of a concrete proposal is
desirable. In 1990, a committee appointed by the chief judge of the
New York Court of Appeals proposed that the courts adopt rules
compelling New York lawyers to donate 40 hours every two years
to advance the legal needs of the poor."' The mandatory pro bono proposal contained the following details: Law firms could credit
the excess hours of some firm lawyers to meet the obligations of
others. Lawyers in small firms of less than ten lawyers could satisfy their obligation by paying $1,000 each, in lieu of time, to support legal services for the poor. A third alternative permits law
firms or unaffiliated lawyers to hire an attorney to discharge their
collective obligation to devote time.
The proposal, like mandatory pro bono plans elsewhere, divided
the New York bar. Most bar associations opposed it, but individual
lawyers and a few bar associations supported it. The Association of
the Bar of the City of New York, which is representative of New
York City's largest firms, "'reluctantly' but forcefully endorsed the
proposal as essential to meet a 'desperate' need... 4' In light of
tus mixed reaction, Chief Judge Wachtler postponed action on the
report in the hope that the stimulus it provided to voluntary pro
bono would suffice to meet the problem.
The argument for mandatory pro bono usually proceeds along
the following lines: (1) There is an unmet need for vital legal
services, especially on the part of poor. people. (2) A lawyer is
necessary for meaningful access to the justice system. (3) The
American ideal of equal justice under law is undermined by lack
of access to justice. (4) Although voluntary pro bono is commendable, it has proven insufficient, even when supplemented by modest
public funds in the form of the national legal services program.
Therefore, (6) lawyers must satisfy the unmet need with mandated
services, at least until other alternatives, such as adequate provision
of publicly-funded services, are put in place.142
Even if one accepts the premises of this argument, malng the

duct in 1980); Symposium on Mandatory Pro Bono, 19 HoFSTRA L. REV. 739 (1991).
140. COMMITE TO IMPROVE THE AVAILABILI Y OF LEoAL SERVICES, FINAL REPORT
TO THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (1990), reprinted in 19 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 755, 768 (1991) (generally referred to as the Marrero Report, after its chairman).
141. Symposium on Mandatory Pro Bono, supra note 139, at 1115.

142. For a more extended argument, see LtBAN, supra note 134, at 267-89.
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obligation of lawyers to represent the poor a legal duty, as distinct
from an ethical exhortation, encounters opposition based on a number of legal, moral, and practical grounds.
The legal objections rest on various constitutional provisions,

including freedom of speech and association, the takings clause,
equal protection, and involuntary servitude. The legal arguments
have generally been rejected in the context in which they have the

largest force: Court-appointment programs which require an appointed lawyer to devote a substantial amount of time to handling

a particular matter.'

The imposition of a modest annual pro bo-

no obligation on lawyers who are extensively regulated and have
an exclusive license to practice is hard to perceive as involuntary
servitude.)" If the lawyer is given a great deal of choice concern-

ing how the required service is performed, as is the case in most
mandatory proposals, a claim that free speech and associational
rights are impaired is also difficult to maintain. Whether mandatory

pro bono is wise or desirable is perhaps a more important inquiry
than whether it passes constitutional muster.'45

143. See Family Div. Trial Lawyers v. Moultrie, 725 F.2d 695, 705-I1 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(ruling that compulsory appointment of lawyers for uncompensated representation of parents in child neglect and parental termination cases was not a takong; but case remanded
for a further hearing on an equal protection claim arising out of limitation of that obligation to juvenile defenders); United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633, 635 (9th Cir. 1965)
(deciding that compulsory appointment of a lawyer not a taking), cert. denied. 382 U.S.
978 (1966); Unites States v. Shackney, 333 F.2d 475, 485-87 (2d Cir. 1964) (holding that
only physical restraint or legal confinement constitutes involuntary servitude). But see
DeLisio v. Alaska Superior Court, 740 P.2d 437, 439 (Alaska 1987) (court appointment
was a temporary taking requiring just compensation); State ex rel. Scott v. Roper, 688
S.W.2d 757, 764-69 (Mo. 1985) (suggesting that uncompensated service presents a constitutional question). See generally Shapiro. supra note 137, at 765 (arguing that compelling
a lawyer to represent a particular client or to assert certain positions is "more troublesome
than a tax in dollars"): Bruce A. Green, Note, Court Appointment of Attorneys in Civil
Cases: The Constitutionality of Uncompensated Legal Assistance, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 366
(1981) (discussing the constitutionality of mandatory court appointment of lawyers in civil
cases).
144. Although the practice of law is a property interest protected by the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957), a
requirement that a relatively small number of hours be devoted to public service each
year is supported by the bar's historic tradition of response to court appointment and falls
short of a "taking."
145. In Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296 (1989), the Court did not
reach constitutional issues relating to a federal-court assignment program. In Mallard, the
Court held, 5-4, that the federal statute empowering a federal judge to "request" an attorney to represent an indigent in a civil case did not create a legally binding obligation on
the part of the attorney. Id. at 301. Justice Brennan's opimon for the majority acknowledged the tradition that members of the bar have an obligation to represent indigents, Id.

1994]

FUTURE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION

585

The moral objections to mandatory pro bono are that mandated
service intrudes on personal autonomy; that it converts a gift of
volunteered services into the duty of a compelled exaction, thus
depriving the actor of the moral significance of the gift of service; and that in application it tends to be regressive and inequitable, falling with a heavier hand on the less affluent and less
successful lawyers.
The principal practical objections to mandatory pro -bono rest
on concerns about the quality and efficiency of mandated services

(a feasibility concern, discussed in the next paragraph); the burdensome problems of admimstration and enforcement; the discouragement of charitable and bar association work if they are excluded
from the required pro bono category, as in the New York proposal;
and, finally, a concern that, if adopted in only one jurisdiction,
lawyers in that state will be adversely affected vis-a-vis their com-

petitors in other states. A pro bono obligation imposed on New
York lawyers, for example, will operate essentially as a tax on
legal services, putting New York lawyers in a less favorable position with respect to clients who can go elsewhere for legal services
to either national law firms or lawyers in nearby states.
The problem of feasibility asks whether, for example, an office
lawyer engaged in bond debenture work may be an effective advocate for poor people. 7 The law in which poor people typically

at 310, but interpreted the history as establishing an ethical rather than legal obligation:
."To justify coerced, uncompensated legal services on the basis of a firm tradition in
England and the United States is to read into that tradition a story that is not there."' Id.
at 304 (quoting David L. Shapiro, The Enigma of the Lawyer's Duty to Serve, 55 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 735, 753 (1980)). The Mallard case is discussed in Hazard, supra note 135, at
221.
146. Moral philosophers and economists have debated whether the provision of blood
for transfusions may best be met exclusively by voluntary donation (as in the United
Kingdom) or by purchase as well as gift. Richard Titmuss's comparative study concludes
that the British approach, forbidding the development of a market for blood, fosters "the
gift relationship!' and is more effective in providing blood, while the more commercial approach in the United States results in chronic shortages. RiCHAPD Trrmuss, THE Gi'r
RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO SOCIAL POLICY (1971) (studying the scientific,
social, economic, and ethical issues involved in the procurement of human blood). See
Peter Singer, Altruism and Commerce: A Defense of Titmuss Against Arrow, 2 PHIt. &
PuB. AFF. 312 (1973) (defending Titmuss against some of Arrow's criticisms while also
comparing voluntary and commercial means of obtaining blood). But see Kenneth Arrow,
Gifts and Exchanges, I PHIL. & Pun. A/F. 343 (1972) (reflecting on Titmuss's theory
that the allocation of goods and services is not accomplished entirely by exchange). The
altruistic impulse is also the target of President Bush's frequent references to "a thousand
points of light."
147. Some observers believe that the costs of arranging and supervising pro bono oppor-
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become involved is a set of highly technical subjects with which
most lawyers are unfamiliar. Most law schools do not teach these
subjects, at least not in an integrated way Representation of indigent criminal defendants requires familiarity with crimnal law and
its practice. Representation of poor people in disputes with a welfare department requires familiarity with a complicated body of
federal and state law along with local administrative practice in
admimstenng that law The law of landlord and tenant, which
affects many poor people, is similarly complicated. From a political-economic viewpoint, most poor people exist in a semi-socialist
regime in which their lives are continuously dependent on government regulation and discretion. Hence, in most localities, certainly
in all major cities, a very soplusticated system would be required
to provide that every lawyer be on call for whatever may be the
legal needs of the poor. These difficulties would be less severe,
however, if the law governing the poor were as central to the law
school curriculum as is corporation law, constitutional law, or
administrative law As law school patterns stand, most lawyers
enter the practice of law without a foundation in the subjects affecting the poor.
A related problem is equalizing the burden of service on all
members of the bar. While the bar as a whole may have a monopoly of law practice, no single lawyer or law firn does. If the burden of discharging the collective responsibility were not equitably
apportioned, widely disparate burdens would be involved. Lawyers
who had undertaken to learn a specialty in the "law of the poor"
would be particularly vulnerable, and that would create perverse
incentives to remain unskilled in poverty law ' The difficulties
could be ameliorated if lawyers were required, through continuing
legal education and practice, to maintain competence in some field
of "poverty law ""' But these measures would be burdensome

tunities (traming, administering referrals, and monitoring performance) exceed the benefits.
Esther Lardent, Pro Bono in the 1990s: The Uncertain Future of Attorney Voluntartsm, n
CIVIL JUSTICE: AN AGENDA FOR THE 1990s 425, 433 (1990) (mandatory pro bono programis will make a "very small dent in a very large problem").
148. See, e.g., Family Div. Trial Lawyers v. Moultrie, 725 F.2d 695, 697-99 (D.C. Cir.

1984), involving a court rule that required lawyers who had signed up to receive compensated court assignments as juvenile defenders, as a condition of receiving compensated assignments, to accept court appointments for uncompensated representation of indigent parents in child neglect and parental termination proceedings.
149. Should law students be required during law school to assist in providing legal
assistance to the poor? As of 1992, a handful of law schools imposed such a requirement.
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and expensive. Provision of publicly-funded legal services for the
poor provides a supplementary or alternative approach.
E. Publicly Funded Legal Services for Poor People
1. Development of Federal Legal Services Program 5 '
Legal Aid in various forms began around 1900, sometimes as
self-help associations of worker and immigrant groups, sometimes
as charities. Through the 1950s legal aid programs were funded
almost entirely by charity and subscription of members of the bar.
The programs usually had a small staff, often one person, assisted
by volunteers and law students. The agencies were few in number,
located almost exclusively in major cities, thinly funded, relatively
passive, concentrating on individual cases and having the aura of a
charity. In the 1960s, the Ford Foundation made legal aid a major
undertaking and infused it with new money, new stature, and new
assertiveness. In 1964, President Johnson's Office of Economic
Opportunity initiated funding for a quantum leap in civil legal
assistance. The federal legal services program, discussed more fully
below, originated in the OEO initiative.
The visionaries and activists who started the legal services
movement in the turbulent 1960s had three missions m mind: (1)
the individual client-service mission of traditional legal aid, (2) law
reform and institutional change, and (3) empowering poor people
by creating organized groups that might engage in direct action
such as boycotts, demonstrations and political activity. The activists
in the legal services movement were committed to the last two
objectives and were critical of emphasis on the first. They deprecated individual-client assistance as "band-aid" work that failed to

See Iohn R. Kramer, Law Schools and the Delivery of Legal Services-First, Do No
Harm, in CVIL JUSTICE: AN AGENDA FOR THE 1990s 45, 57 (1991) ("The best way to
alter attorneys' attitudes is from the ground up by instilling in law students a sense of
the responsibilities they must shoulder when they become members of the bar.").
150. For general and historical background, see generally EMERY A. BROWNELL, LEGAL
AID IN THE UNITED STATES (1951) (discussing the status of legal aid, its history, its philosophy, and a look into the future); JEROME S. CARLIN ET AL., ClIL JUSTICE AND THE
POOR (1966) (exanuing issues relevant to the sociology of law); ELLIOT CHEATHAM, A
LAWYER WHE NEEDED (1963) (discussing their right to counsel in the United States);
BARLOW F. CHRISTENsEN, LAWYERS FOR PEOPLE OF MODERATE MEANS (1970) (studying
the availability of legal services and making recommendations for changes); EARL JOHNSON, JR., JUSTICE AND REFORM: THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF THE OEO LEGAL SERVIcES
PROGRAM (1974) (studying, the political processes behind the Legal Services Program of
the Office of Economic Opportunity); REGINALD HEBER SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE POOR
(1919) (analyzing law, poverty, and legal administration).
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They sought to direct the
get at fundamental problems.'
program's resources into social advocacy and organizational activity The provision of lawyers for otherwise represented persons in
dealing with public or private institutions resulted in numerous
decisions requiring more elaborate procedure or establishing new
substantive law The ultimate objective-a substantial redistribution
of societal wealth and power-proved to be too large and too
politically controversial to be accomplished by lawyers through the
mechanism of the courts.
The social reform potential visualized in the 1960s, for the
federal legal assistance program excited hopes of reformers and
fears of conservatives, both probably exaggerated. The result was a
political struggle for control of the program, involving the organized bar at various levels, political action groups, factions in
Congress, and various agencies in the Government. Broadly speaking, the reformers sought to make legal aid programs a vehicle for
structural legal reform through test cases, class actions, and legislative activity, in such areas as housing, civil rights, education,
women's rights, and regulation of the workplace. The conservatives
sought to maintain legal aid as a service program for needy individuals in such traditional matters as child support and custody,
landlord-tenant disputes, debtor-creditor disputes, and securing
welfare benefits.'
In 1974, a detente of sorts was reached. The federal legal
services program was established on a permanent basis through the
Legal Services Corporation Act. 5 3 The statutory objectives are
stated in politically neutral terms of "equal access to justice" and
"high-quality legal assistance" for the poor." Political and organizational activities on the part of legal services lawyers are largely
excluded by specific restrictions: a ban on political activity by

151. See Stephen Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 YALE LJ. 1049. 1053

(1970) ("If all the lawyers in the country worked full time, they could not deal with even
In tlus setting the object of practicing
the articulated legal problems of the poor
poverty law must be to organize poor people, rather than to solve their legal problems.").

152. See CARLTN Er AL., supra note 150 (stressing the need to broaden the kinds of
services available to the poor); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Law Reforming in the Anti-Pover-

ty Effort, 37 U. Ctu. L. REv. 242 (1970) (questioning whether the law-reform potential of
litigation through the Legal Services Program is exaggerated); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.,
Social Justice Through Civil Justice, 36 U. Cmt. L. Rav. 699 (1969) (arguing that social

reform is an unwise goal for the Legal Services Program).
153. Legal Services Corporation Act, Pub. L. No. 93-355, 88 Stat. 378 (1974) (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2996-29961 (1988)).
154. 42 U.S.C. § 2996 (1988).
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lawyers in the field, a prohibition on participation in organizational
activity (as distinct from legal advice concerning it) and procedural
constraints on the use of class actions. These restrictions suggest
that individual-client service and test-case litigation arising out of it
constitute the central statutory mission.
The structure of the national program involves the Legal Services Corporation (LSC) as a funding agency for local programs
that actually represent clients and deliver legal services. The Corporation is forbidden from providing legal services to eligible poor
persons, but it has an uncertain amount of regulatory authority over
the operation of the local programs. Restrictions on the matters that
could be undertaken by the local programs were included in the
original Act (e.g., abortion and school desegregation cases). These
restrictions *have since been modified, elaborated, and fought over,
each time in highly political battles. Parallel struggles have occurred over the level of funding.
President Reagan was strongly against any reformist tendency
in legal aid and favored abolishing the Legal Services Corporation.
Major bar associations, led by the American Bar Association, along
with various civil rights and other activist groups, held out for
continuing the program. In the 1980s, the program continued on
funding dimmished by budget cuts and inflation. The federal legal
services program has emerged with modest funding and a relatively
traditional program, but on a more or less permanent basis. Periodic disputes over restrictions on program activities as well as funding levels are likely to recur.'
2. Recurring Policy Issues
a.

Staff-attorney system vs. judicare

The United States is distinctive in that civil legal assistance to
the poor is provided primarily by organizations that employ "poverty lawyers"--lawyers who are employed full time by local nonprofit organizations engaged m delivering legal services to eligible
poor persons (generally defined as persons whose household incomes are below 125% of the federal "poverty line"). In other

155. See Roger C. Cramton, Crisis in Legal Services for the Poor, 26 Vu. L. REV.
521 (1981) (exploring the debate over President Reagan's proposed budget cuts for the
Legal Services Program); Came Menkel-Meadow, Legal Aid in the United States: The
Professionalization and Politicization of Legal Services in the 1980s, 22 OsGOODE HALL

LJ. 29 (1984) (expressing concern that governmental resistance to the provision of legal
assistance for the poor has grown during the 1980s).
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countries, eligible poor persons are referred to members of the
private bar, who are then paid by the state at rates fixed by statute
or regulation. The latter system, by analogy to Medicare, is referred to as "Judicare" in the United States.
The staff-attorney system, which is favored by most participants in the U.S. legal services movement, provides a cadre of
lawyers who are intellectually and personally committed to serving
the poor. The delivery of service may be organized so that clients
are served by experienced specialists in various areas of poverty
law, such as welfare, housing, or education. Further, the staff-attorney system permits more aggressive pursuit of institutional reform
that benefits groups of poor people rather than merely an individual client.
Proponents of Judicare as a replacement of or an alternative to
the staff-attorney system argue that the use of private lawyers
permits a more normal lawyer-client relationship (the client chooses
the lawyer and controls the objectives of the representation) and
leads to greater client satisfaction.' 5 Some proponents favor Judicare for precisely the reasons that those enamored with law reform litigation prefer the staff attorney system: Judicare is more
likely to stick to individual-client service. Studies performed by the
Legal Service Corporation indicate that both systems are feasible,
the existence of some staff component is essential in controlling
costs, and the staff system offers a potential of having a larger
impact on the legal rights and living conditions of eligible clients. 57
b. Who should be served?
The demand for free goods, even if their use involves time and
inconvenience, is likely to exceed the available supply. The result
is an inevitable rationing problem. Because lawyers cannot and will
not be provided to all people who feel aggrieved and who lack the
resources or capacity to seek relief on their own, someone must
decide who will be served. Local legal services programs are re156. See SAMUEL J. BRAKEL, JUDICARE: PUBLIC FUNDS, PRIVATE LAWYERS, AND POOR

PEOPLE (1974) (presenting empirical evidence that experimental clients have been more

satisfied with Judicare than with the staff-attorney system); Samuel .. Brakel, Stles of
Delivery of Legal Services to the Poor: A Review Article, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. .
219 (1977) (criticizing the notion that staff-attorney systems are superior to Judicare and
stressing the need to keep Judicare as an option).
157. LEGAL SERViCES CORPORATION, THE DELIVERY SYSTEMS STUDY: A POLICY REPORT TO THE CONGRESS AND PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 7 (1980).
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quired to establish priorities after consultation with representatives
of client groups, but it is generally recogmzed that staff lawyers
play a large role m shaping and then administering priorities. The
establishment of a priority in one area, such as public housing
issues, may lead to refusing service in categories of other cases. A
number of legal services programs, for example, refuse to accept
divorce cases. Critics of the current program suggest more neutral
principles, such as queuing, or some effort to replicate the private
market, as with a voucher system or client copayments' 58
Defenders of current arrangements rely on utilitarian arguments
of triage: Because funding is so limited, scarce resources must be
devoted to the most serious problems that will do the most good
for poor people as a whole. This argument places group interests
above the right of individuals to obtain access to justice to defend
or enforce their legal rights. Inevitably, it places authority in staff
lawyers who decide what cases to take and, in doing so and in
handling the subsequent representation, make decisions as to what
is in the best interests of poor people. Finally, it departs from the
traditional lawyer-client relationship in ways that should be avoided
if possible.
(1) Individuals are entitled to minimal legal service on
vital matters. The United States at present falls to provide
its poor citizens with a minimal access to justice. The
Legal Services Corporation estimates that only about 20
percent of poor people needing legal help get it. Even if
this figure is much exaggerated (many of those below the
eligibility line have sufficient resources to pay the relatively
low fees required for some routine legal services, such as
an uncontested divorce), a much larger emphasis on caring
for individuals in need is desirable. Perhaps we cannot
afford to do so, but the problem appears to be one of
mistaken social priorities. Given the political opposition to
the current program, a gradual shift to one resembling the
European model-reimbursmg at low rates members of the

158. See Douglas J. Besharov, Introduction to LEGAL SERVICES FOR THE POOR: TIME
FOR REFORM xiii, xIv-xvi (Douglas J. Besharov ed. 1990) (staff lawyers who dominate
priority setting devote little effort to the problems associated with family breakdown, the
most critical problem of poor people today; client copayments would force clients to
choose among their needs); Marshall . Breger. Legal Aid for the Poor: A Conceptual
Analysis, 60 N.C. L. REV. 281 (1982) (arguing that utilitarian justifications of a lawyer-

centered rationing of service should be replaced by an individual-rights approach).
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private bar who provide legal services on meritorious matters-is warranted. I do not make this argument as one of
constitutional entitlement, but as a basic social provision
that a legislature concerned with social justice should im159
plement.
(2) What are the interests of the poor? The "interests
of the poor" are not easily determinable. The current view,
resting on a claim that legal services lawyers know what
these group interests are, is limited and elitist. The interests
of the poor are complex and variegated. To assume the
right to take steps on their behalf is paternalistic. It is not
obvious that the highly educated, middle class lawyers who
make those decisions on behalf of poor people are well
qualified to do so. Moreover, the rewards and incentives
within the legal services program flow from establishing
new rights and procedures, though it is not clear in many
cases whether legal victories on these matters really serve
the interests of the poor as a whole. Thus, the systematic
efforts of many legal services programs to convert residence in a subsidized public housing project into a legal
right that can be terminated only by formal procedures is
thought by many (perhaps most) residents of public housing projects to be harmful to their interests. Effective
means of eliminating violent and drug-pushing tenants have
been eliminated, with adverse results on the living environment. Similarly, successful efforts by legal services lawyers
to require more elaborate procedures for school discipline
are thought by many informed individuals to have worsened educational opportunities in central city public
schools.
Evidence is lacking that the law reform and political
action models of the legal services movement have actually
produced beneficial results for poor people. Every action,
such as increased enforcement of building codes in low-

159. See Breger, supra note 158. Breger argues, persuasively in my view, that the
claims of poor people of access to justice are best protected through allocation and litigation procedures that give equal weight to each person's complaint, not by procedures that
turn on the group impact of a given poor person's case. But see Mane A. Failinger &
Larry May, Litigating Against Poverty: Legal Services and Group Representation, 45 OHiO
ST. L.J. 1 (1984) (disputing Breger's claim that access rights are more important than
welfare rights).
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income housing, leads to a counter action, such as reduction of the housing supply or increased rents. Although the
strategy of the legal services movement-to use the courts
to establish rights that would benefit poor people-was
well-meaning, a high price in political support has been
paid for dubious returns in the form of distributive justice.
(3) Departurefrom a normal lawyer-client relationship.
In most cases of private representation, there is no problem
of identifying the client or who speaks for the client. If an
individual is represented, that person decides on the objectives of the representation and, even as to tactics and methods, must be consulted."t e The client makes the decision
whether or not to settle, determines how much should be
expended on the representation and is free to discharge the
lawyer at any time. The relationship is different with poor
clients, who are more dependent on their lawyers and who
have nowhere else to go for legal representation.' When
a lawyer is representing a corporation, identifying the client
is more complicated if there is an internal fight for control.
However, in the more usual situation in which the corporation is opposing third persons or the government, the managers of the corporation are in a position to make decisions
concerning the direction, methods and cost of representation." In short, the private client is in charge, with, the
160. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.2, 1.4 (1990) (allocating
decision-making authority in the lawyer-client relationship and stating a lawyer's duty to
communicate with a client). The Model Rules have been adopted with various changes in
37 states. For discussion of the lawyer-client relationship, see Barbara A. Curran, Surveying the Legal Needs of the Public: What the Public Wants and Expects in the LawyerClient Relationship, in LAW IN A CYNICAL SOCIETY?: OPINION AND LAW IN THE 1980's
107 (Dale Gibson & Janet IC. Baldwin eds., 1985); DOUGLAS E. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER
AND CLIENT. WHO's IN CHARGE? (1974) (a study of the relationship between personal
injury clients and their lawyers); Robert A. Burt, Conflict and Trust Between Attorney and
Client, 69 GEO. LJ. 1015 (1981); Austin Sarat, Lmyers and Clients: Putting Professional
Service on the Agenda of Legal Education, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 43 (1991).
161. Once the attorney-client relationship has been formed, either by appointment of a
court or, more likely, by acceptance of a case by a legal services office, the lawyer and
client are essentially in a deadly embrace. The lawyer cannot easily withdraw from the
representation; the client has no other choice other than the lawyer assigned. If personalities conflict, a legal services program may assign a different lawyer to the matter. The
lawyer, who possesses superior information and skill and is balancing the interests of one
client against those of others in what is usually a heavy caseload, is in control.
162. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13 (1990) (stating that a
lawyer for an organization represents the entity not its agents or employees). For discussion of the duties owed to a lawyer when the client (an organization) owes duties to
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lawyer acting as the client's agent.

The deployment of the scarce time of lawyers in a
legal services office is a very different situation in which
the private-representation analogy is not fully applicable.
The private-representation analogy most fully applies when
a legal services lawyer is representing an individual client
in a matter that has few implications beyond the individual
case, whether the matter is a divorce, a bankruptcy, or a
welfare benefits problem. Even here, however, the priority-

setting process may lead the program's lawyers, who as a
practical matter control the timing and outcomes of this
process, to reject entire categories of cases, such as those
dealing with family problems, in order to deal with what

the lawyers feel are more fundamental problems of poor
people."r As staff lawyers develop specialized competencies, these priorities are resistant to change.'

Any candid

discussion of client participation in the setting of priorities
reflects the truth that no good method of reflecting the
interests of all eligible clients in a service area has yet
been devised."6 Nor is it clear that there is any way to

others (e.g., shareholders), see Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Triangular Lawyer Relationships:
An Exploratory Analysis, 1 GEO. 1. LEGAL ETHICS 15 (1987).
163. See Paul R. Tremblay, Toward a Community-Based Ethic for Legal Services Practice, 37 UCLA L. REV. 1101 (1990). Tremblay argues that the legal services lawyer faces
the dilemma of choosing between allegiance to the individual client and making choices
and imposing limits that serve interests of groups of poor people. He states: "Legal services offices must engage in a form of triage, or 'screening of [clients] to determine their
priority for treatment [i.e., representation].' They cannot allocate their services according to
the usual method of price, so they must choose other means to decide between potentially
eligible clients." Id. at 1111 (citation omitted). See also MtCHAcm LipsKY. STREET-LEvEL
BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN PUBLIC SERVICES 81-158 (1980) (discussing the allocation of services among clients).
164. Social programs tend to conform over time to the interests of the staff who run
them. The legal services program has been criticized as a "lawyers' program" run by lawyers. Empirical studies provide some support. See, e.g., JACK KATZ, POOR PEOPLE'S LAWYERS IN TRANSITION (1982).
165. Alan Houseman, one of the most experienced and knowledgeable observers of the
legal services movement, has stated that client participation has not achieved its goals, and
good solutions to the problem do not exist. Tremblay contends that legal services lawyers
must make choices among their present clients in much the same fashion that they make
choices among prospective clients. He states that "[the process of client representation is
an elastic one; absent some control on demand, such as billing in the private sphere, the
subsidized client will continue to compete with his fellow clients for the scarce time,
energy, and funds available to his lawyer." Tremblay, supra note 163, at 1115. Tremblay,
a former legal services lawyer, defends the practical reality that "a legal services lawyer
must make normative choices among her clients in distributing the scarce funds.' let at
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replicate in the distribution of a public good the consumer
sovereignty provided by free markets in goods and services.
When cases in a legal services program arise that raise
larger issues, there is a temptation to shape the case, not to
meet the interests of the individual client, but to raise the
larger issue that, in the view of the program's lawyers, will
advance the strategic interests of a class of poor people.'"
A lawyer for a private client must withdraw when faced
with a conflict of interest between that client and other
clients, but the legal services client has no other options
and may be induced to consent to a more limited or representative litigation." The problem arises in selecting of
cases and issues, framing the objectives of litigation, and
deciding whether and on what terms to settle. At the extreme end of the spectrum is the class action in which the
legal services lawyer may have constructed the legal theory,
constituted the class, selected its representatives, and made
all of the decisions along the way, including a decision to
settle, that may not accord on the merits or in remedial
aspects with the interests or desires of a majority of the
represented class. Here, as in the kindred situation of representative suits brought on behalf of amorphous classes of
shareholders or consumers, it is a fiction to think of the
client class as being in control of the litigation.'68 The
lawyer for the class is primarily in charge, and the pnncipal check comes from the requirement that the judge approve any settlement.
Thus, the analogy to private representation must take
account of the fact that client control of litigation becomes
suspect in legal services litigation involving broad issues; at
the extreme of a class action seeking injunctive relief,
1120.
166. This proposition is conceded and defended by Luban and Tremblay. See LUBAN,
supra note 134; Tremblay, supra note 163.
167. See Fiandaca v. Cunningham, 827 F.2d 825 (1st Cir. 1987) (conflict between two
groups of eligible clients simultaneously represented by a legal services organization resulted in disqualification of counsel).
168. See Greenfield v. Villager Indus., Inc., 483 F.2d 824, 832 n.9 (3d Cir. 1973) ("Experience teaches that it is counsel for the class representative and not the named parties.
who direct and manage [class] actions. Every experienced federal judge knows that any
statements to the contrary is sheer sophistry."). See also Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1183 (1982) (stressing the need for procedural
reform to allow class action clients to have more control over the litigation).
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control by clients is usually fictitious. In those situations,
the lawyer should be viewed as either lacking a client or as
his or her own client.
Restructuring the legal services program to provide
individual-care service through private lawyers, reimbursed
by public funding at rates specified by regulation (e.g., so
much for a personal bankruptcy or an uncontested divorce),
would provide poor people with a relatively normal lawyerclient relationship. A staff-attorney component would remain to provide screening of cases for eligibility and merit,
to refer cases to an appropriate private lawyer, to maintain
quality control, and to provide payment. In addition, a
central legal services organization in major cities or on a
state-wide basis would provide necessary functions: (1)
trainmng for private lawyers who desire to give pro bono
assistance on a part-time basis, and (2) back-up support on
specialized poverty-law matters for private lawyers handling
such cases.
c. Standard of service
Ordinary people who desire a lawyer to prepare a will, get a
divorce, or facilitate a transaction must pay the customary charge
of lawyers for that service. Numerous studies indicate that many of
them forego the use of legal services because of cost, inconvenience, or fear of becoming involved in the legal machinery Those
with little choice, who are cast as defendants in a proceeding
brought by someone else, reluctantly hire lawyers, but generally
push them to handle the matter as cheaply as possible. The result
is a world in which most people "lump it" on many legal matters
and get low-cost or mimmal representation on many others. That is
the reality of the legal market place in which most private persons
make their decisions.
The most ambitious vision of legal services for the poor, however, looks to the representation provided to wealthy individuals
and large corporations in high-stakes matters as the appropriate
analogy Earl Johnson, who headed the OEO legal program in the
1960s, states that he learned what full-service lawyering for a
client really meant from a partner at Covington & Burling who
represented American Airlines in highstakes matters. Poor people,
Johnson concluded, are entitled to the same quality and extent of
legal service that is provided to a wealthy client m a high-stakes
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matter: aggressive advocacy at every stage, including appeals, representation in adminmstrative and legislative proceedings, including
lobbying, and use of representative or class actions when in the
interest of the client. The implication is that eligible clients of
publicly funded legal services offices are entitled to what only a
few wealthy persons and large corporations actually receive: unrestricted full-service lawyenng that leaves no stone unturned and is
not as restrained by considerations of cost as would be true of
lawyering for most other persons and entities.
The premises of Johnson's argument, however, are fallacious.
Upper income people, let alone people of lesser means, do not
employ a "full court press" in litigation except where it appears
cost effective and often not even then. Such a commitment of legal
services may be warranted where the existence of a wealthy organization is threatened, but it is not warranted, even with wealthy
people, in a dispute over repairs on a Mercedes. A scheme of
misdirected policy flows from a false assumption about what the
non-poor do regarding use of legal services, which is then used as
a predicate of a demand for equal treatment of the poor.
Moreover, if society was committed to giving the poor an
income supplement equal in value to the "full court press" which
is urged on their behalf by lawyers, why should it be provided in
the form of lawyers' services rather than in the form of a welfare
check? 69 Individual poor persons would undoubtedly prefer the
freedom of choosing how much they want to spend on legal services and other wants. Knowing that this is the case, providing
assistance only in prescribed forms (i.e., lawyers, not money which
poor people might use for their own purposes) is defended on the
ground that the full court press in this case will rebound to the
benefit of other poor people. But we are now back to the class-suit
fallacy, in which optimistic, if not absurd, claims concerning its
beneficial consequences are used to justify its use in the judicial
arena. The class-suit strategy is appealing because it provides interesting employment for capable lawyers with an intense concern for
169. Some critics of the federal legal services program argue that it is a lawyers' program that primarily benefits lawyers by providing interesting employment to a substantial
number of politically concerned lawyers and requiring private interests who oppose the
legal services lawyers to spend much larger amounts in hiring lawyers to defend their
interests. In this view, the decision to provide poor people not with money but with lawyers is what the program is really about, a subsidy of lawyers. See Stephen Chapman,
The Rich Get Rich, and the Poor Get Lawyers, This NEw REPUBLIC, Sept. 24, 1977, at 9
(citing numerous benefits the legal services program creates for lawyers).
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the poor. This is not the first time that a social benefit program
has been captured by the professionals who administer it.
One caution is warranted. The stakes involved in some test
cases or class actions clearly justify full-service Iawyerng. The
aggregation of small, related claims may collectively constitute a
major claim that justifies a substantial commitment of legal resources whether the case is pursued by a legal services lawyer
without fee or by a class-action lawyer who anticipates a fee award
from a successful action.
Other matters, however, present issues of proportionality and
fairness as well as those of effectiveness that have already been
discussed. A private litigant ordinarily will not pursue a $1,000
matter by expending more than some fraction of that amount on
legal services. But a publicly funded lawyer is not similarly constrained in litigation on behalf of a poor client. As Gary Bellow
and others have recognized, this fact confers substantial leverage on
legal services lawyers in dealing with private persons and some
leverage in dealing with government agencies. Because the costs of
litigation from the point of view of a private person may be larger
than the amount at stake, the possibility of extortionate settlements
exists. A litigation strategy that targets a particular defendant is
likely to impose costs that mandate an early settlement. The constraints on this behavior by legal services lawyers are the practical
ones of heavy caseloads and limited staffs, constraints that advocates of full-service lawyering on behalf of the poor vigorously
lament and want removed.
Shifting to a Judicare model would eliminate most of the fairness problems of disproportionality in civil legal assistance. Poor
people would receive through state funding the same standard of
service normally provided to middle-class and lower middle-class
Americans who pay their own way
d. Social advocacy vs. individual client service 7 '
The activist vision is one in winch lawyers improve the lives
of poor people by redistributing power to them so they can influence decisions that will affect them. Gary Bellow, for example,
criticized the tendency of most legal service organizations to devote
170. See generally Breger, supra note 158 (concluding that the individual rights of
clients should take precedence over utilitarian concerns for poor people as a group);
Failinger & May, supra note 159 (disputing Breger's contention that individual rights are
more important than group welfare rights).
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most of their effort to individual client service.' Poorly trained
and inexperienced lawyers were thrown into frustrating and tensionladen situations that resulted in minimal service and did little to
ease the larger problems of the poor. The program's potential for
social change, he argued, could not be achieved unless its priorities
were reversed. Political organization of the poor would come first,
followed by aggressive pursuit of strategic priorities that would
apply maximum pressure in favor of institutional and legal changes
that affect large numbers of poor people.
A massive expansion of minimal, routinized legal assistance throughout the low-income areas of the country,
mediated by selective efforts at "law reform", is potentially
a powerful system of social control, capable of defining
and legitimating particular grievances and resolutions and
ignoring others. Legal aid lawyers, unwilling or unable to
respond to client concerns in ways which link them to a
larger vision of social justice, can readily become purveyors of acquiescence and resignation among the people that
they are seeing to help. Clients can be literally "taught"
that their situations are natural, inevitable, or their own
fault, and that dependence on professional advice and guidance is their only appropriate course of action; that is, legal
assistance for the poor can become a bulwark of existing
social arrangements. To echo a now familiar phrase, a
profession that is not part of the solution can soon become
part of the problem. The legal aid experience may soon be
a troubling illustration of the modem homily.1 "
David Luban provides an elaborate philosophical defense of a
vision of politicized legal services.173 A specific example of the
kind of services he favors graphically raises all the important ob-

171. Gary Bellow, Turning Solutions Into Problems: The Legal Aid Experience, 34
NLADA BRIEFCASE 106, 122 (1977) [hereinafter Turning Solutions]. See also Gary Bellow, Legal Aid in the United States. 14 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 337 (1980).
172. Bellow, Turning Solutions, supra note 171, at 122. See also KATZ, supra note 164.

Katz's study of the legal services program in Chicago finds that dunng the 1970s "law
reform" activities replaced an earlier emphasis on organization and community education.
The result was what Katz calls the "legalization of poverty." Legal services lawyers
helped create government programs for the poor that were professionally administered,
confined by formal procedures, and limited by rules and standards. Poverty lawyers became poverty managers, reinforcing the segregation of the poor as a social class by the
state.
173. See LUBAN, supra note 134.
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jections to politicized public interest law practice:
The center's lawyers manipulated clients, took sides in a
dispute within the client community (over whether the
development should be built in an integrated neighborhood), spent public money to take a partisan stand on several divisive and politically controversial issues, switched
from a general legal services practice to a politicized legal
campaign, and used the courts to take control of a political
institution. All of these are highly debateable tactics. 74
Luban argues that successful law reform solves the problems of
many poor people at once and is, therefore, the most efficient use
of scarce legal resources. He concedes that manipulation and control of clients by lawyers are sometimes involved, but states that
"[n]o one succeeds in politics without getting his hands dirty""
Moreover, the people and groups served by the lawyer's political
use of legal machinery are aware of what is going on. Their free
and mutual commitment to the lawyer's cause justifies the unusual
degree of lawyer control. Winning the battle in the courts rather
than in the legislatures does not violate democratic principles because the courts are intervening on behalf of groups that are underrepresented in the legislatures. Luban concludes that public interest
lawyers, by helping "fragmented constituencies to organize themselves,
serve the highest goal of democracy: to engage citizens
in responsible deliberation about the ends of action." 76
Luban's argument may have some force when applied to the
litigation activities of privately-funded interest groups such as the
NAACP, the Sierra Club, Planned Parenthood, or a trade association interested in a particular matter. The use of a representative
action or test case to raise a larger question which many persons
have an insufficient interest to litigate avoids free-rider problems
and prevents under-enforcement of the law. Even in this context,
however, the supposed under-representation of the various groups
in legislative bodies does not justify countering political injustice
with another injustice. "Democracy" is being used in a very special
sense when interest groups within the larger society rely on unac-

174. Id. at 297-98. Luban's example purports to be derived from a specific case rnvolving Greater Boston Legal Services, but I do not believe his hypothetical accurately reflects
the attitudes or conduct of lawyers in those cases.
175. Id. at 322.
176. Id. at xxv.
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countable, life-tenured officials (federal judges) for social change.
Whatever the limitations, the constitutional assignment of legislative
authority to the elected representatives of the people has much to
be said for it, especially when weighed against the shortcomings of
alternatives.
One need not reach these issues of judicial activism, however,
to conclude that publicly-funded legal services raise very different
social and political issues than the voluntary and private activities
of private groups that resort to the courts for legal vindication.
Why should the general taxpayer support this partisan political
activity?
The critical fact is that Congress has not appropriated funds for
the purpose of orgamzing "fragmented" and otherwise unrepresented groups of poor people for political action or to support test-case
manipulation of clients on behalf of the social activism of legal
services lawyers. The Legal Services Corporation Act 7 prohibits
such activity and permits grants only for the purposes of "furnishing legal assistance to eligible clients."'78 The legal assistance is
to provide "equal access to the system of justice," be of "high
quality," and must be "kept free from the influence of or use ..
of political pressures."'7 Legal services lawyers are commanded
to "protect the best interests of their clients" in accordance with
"the high standards of the legal profession."'80 The substantive
restrictions included in the Act and the procedural constraints on
the use of class actions reinforce the political neutrality of the
basic scheme.
III.

CRITERIA FOR JUDGMENT: THE VALUES OF
"PROFESSIONALISM"

Proposed changes in the regulatory framework that governs the
practice of law cannot be evaluated in the absence of criteria for
evaluation. Any statement of evaluative criteria involves essentially
normative judgments. If these value judgments are to be generally
accepted, they must be rooted in the basic values of the American
political and legal traditions.
177. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2996-29961 (1988).
178. For a discussion of the Legal Services Corporation Act and its legislative history,
see Warren E. George, Development of the Legal Services Corporation, 61 CORNELL L.
REv. 681 (1976).
179. 42 U.S.C. § 2996(1), (2) & (5) (1988).
180. 42 U.S.C. § 2996(6) (1988).
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The approach in this Paper rests on three basic assumptions.
First, lawyer professionalism, if properly understood, provides
meaning to those who work as lawyers, provides benefits to their
clients, and serves public goals of facilitation of private ordering,
conformance to law, and just resolution of disputes. Second, the
benefits of professionalism are dimimshed and may be transformed
into liabilities by the tendency of a professional group to delude
itself into believing that what serves its interests also serves the
interests of others and of society generally Third, the ideology of
professionalism, if it arises out of and is supported by the realities
of practice, is important because it can inspire and influence the
way lawyers organize their practices and understand their everyday
life. Ideal visions of lawyenng and the lawyer's role are not merely rhetorical rationalizations of bar leaders but affect, and are affected by, daily practice.'
Tins section first describes the traditional understanding of
"professionalism" expressed by leaders of the organized bar during
the 20th century. It then outlines modifications of the traditional
understanding that are necessary to meet today's conditions and
those to be expected in the 21st century.
A.

Traditional Understanding of "Professionalism"

The terms "profession" and "professionalism" are elastic terms
that are hard to define." Under modem usage in the West, "profession" generally refers to a social construct consisting of a set of
ideas that give a group of workers and the special community in
which they work a collective identity 83 A profession involves

181. For a good explanation of the nature and significance of professional ideology, see
Robert L. Nelson & David M. Trubek, Arenas of Professionalism: The Professional Ideologies of Lawyers in Context, in LAWYERS'
IDEALS/LAWYERS'
PRACTICES:
TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION 177 (Robert L. Nelson et at.
eds., 1992).

182. As occupational groups other than the three historic learned "professions-law,
medicine and the clergy-claim the honorific connotations of these terms, the question of
what distinguishes a "profession" from any group of workers has engaged sociologists. See
Eliot Freidson, The Theory of Professions: State of the Art, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE
PROFESSIONS: LAWYERS, DOCTORS AND OTHERS 19 (Robert Dingwall & Philip Lewis eds.,

1983) (arguing that a profession is not a generic concept, rather, it changes with historical
context); WILBERT E. MOORE, THE PROFESSIONS: ROLES AND RULEs (1970) (arguing that
professionalism should be measured on a scale of attributes, such as occupation, organization, education, service orientation, and autonomy): Harold L. Wilensky, The
Professionalization of Everyone?, 70 AM. . Soc. 137 (1964) (arguing that traditional
professionalism emphasizes autonomous expertise and the service ideal).
183. William J.Goode, Community Within a Community: The Professions, 22 AM. Soc.
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work that is done for a living and that involves a serious and long-

term commitment."s Its practice requires the possession and application of esoteric knowledge and the. making of complex judgments. The required basic knowledge is acquired over time and
with difficulty during a period of preparation that normally involves a certification by professional elders.
The common bonds of language, preparation, and group associ-

ation create a sense of group self-identity. These collegial qualities
amount to a form of self-regulation, carried on through professional
organizations, and usually involving some delegation by the state
of lawmaking authority. The special privilege of self-regulation is
justified because the group claims special expertise in the provision
of a basic social good, recogmzed as such by the community

(health in the case of physicians, justice or dispute resolution in
the case of lawyers) and to do so for the maximum benefit of
those served and for the public good,,even if at the expense of the
professional's economic advantage.
Finally, the relationship between a professional and her client is
a significant relationship of trust. The client resorts to the professional when and because the client feels inadequate and the professional proposes to remedy this inadequacy. Commonly, there is an

imbalance of information, skill, and authority between the client
and the professional.
Professionalism provides a variety of rewards to members of
the profession. Intrinsic rewards include the satisfactions of: utilizing esoteric knowledge to make complex judgments; employing the

REV. 194. 194 (1957). Goode states that:
Each profession is a community without physical locus
by virtue of these
characteristics: (1) Its members are bound by a sense of identity. (2) Once in
it few leave, so that it is a terminal or continuing status for the most part. (3)
Its members share values in common. (4) Its role definitions vis-A-vis both
members and non-members are agreed upon and are the same for all members.
(5) Within the areas of communal action there is a common language, which is
understood only partially by outsiders. (6) The Community has power over its
members. (7) Its limits are reasonably clear, though they are not physical and
geographical, but social. (8) Though it does not produce the next generation
biologically, it does so socially through its control over the selection of professional trainees, and through its training processes it sends these recruits through
an adult socialization process.
Id. (citation omitted).
184. This and the following paragraphs draw on a definition of "professton" from vanous sources. See THOMAS L. SHAFF1R, FArrH AND THE PROFESStONS 296-297 (1987);
supra notes 181-83.
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technique of craft to achieve immediately recognizable results;as8

service to and personal interaction with those requiring professional
services; and professional colleagueship (a special pleasure for
those working in the company of other congenial and high-quality

professionals). Extnnsic rewards (the privileges of professional86
status) include: exclusive license to carry on certain activities;
high social status; substantial social power and influence;"s and,
relative to other occupations, high income.'

185. Excellence in technical performance is at the center of the professional ethic. William F. May argues that skill, under this ethic, is not just a means to an end, but a
critical part of "the interior experience of the professional who finds meaning in performance per se." WWILLAM F. MAY, THE PHYSICIAN'S COVENANT: IMAGES OF THE HEALER
IN MEDICAL ETHICS 87 (1983). Critics of the professional as technician, May argues, "do
not reckon with that professional ideal for which the result of a deed fades in significance before the beauty of the deed itself." Id. at 88. See also James R. Elkins, Ethics:
Professionalism, Craft, and Failure, 73 KY. L.J. 937 (1985).
186. A statute or court rule in virtually every state provides that persons not admitted
to the bar in that jurisdiction may not engage in the practice of law (except that persons
directly affected may undertake to handle their own legal problems). See the discussion of
unauthorized practice of law, supra notes 92-113 and accompanying text.
187. Supporters as well as critics of the legal profession usually assume that lawyers
exercise considerable influence over their clients and, because of their central role in the
creation and application of governmental authority, in society generally. A more skeptical
view, founded on some empirical study, is that of John P. Heinz, who argues that the
legal profession, "either as a collectivity or as a set of individuals and firms, appears to
lack the power necessary to establish and enforce its own norms." John P. Heinz. The
Power of Lawyers, 17 GA. L. REV. 891, 911 (1983). Heinz further states that
the norms that govern the legal profession-that organize the social structure of
the profession, that determine which lawyers will serve which clients, and that
define who gets what legal services--come from without rather than from within the bar
[L]awyers are not really calling the shots very often in our
society
[T]he prestige of the legal profession, the influence of lawyers
on their clients, and the collective political action of lawyers do not often bnng
about an allocation of the society's scarce resources that differs in any substantial way from the distribution that would have been willed by the lawyers'
clients or by the polity apart from that prestige, influence, or action.
Id.
188. Comprehensive and reliable data concermng the average income of lawyers or the
distribution of lawyers on an income scale is not available. Extremely high annual incomes of over $1 million are reported for lawyers in a small number of highly profitable.
major firms and for very successful plaintiffs' personal-injury lawyers. Altman Weil &
Pensa, a management consulting firm, issues periodic reports of average incomes of partners and associates in the large number of established firms that participate in its studies.
In 1992, the average cash income of firm lawyers was $124,231. Don J. DeBenedictis.
Growing Pains, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1993, at 54 (citing Altman Weil & Pensa, THE 1992
SURVEY OF LAW FIRM ECONOMICS). The average income of all lawyers was $83,487 in
1990. Les Krantz, THE JOBs RATED ALMANAC 180 (2d ed. 1992). Law graduates who begin employment in the highest paying sector of the profession (large law firms in New
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The quid pro quo for these professional privileges is found in
the ideal of professionalism: The "exercise of the learned skills of
lawyering for the maximum benefit of clients in particular and the
public good in general even if at the expense of the attorney's
' The policies of professional associations
economic advantage."189
and practice organizations should be designed to give maximum
support and encouragement to individual efforts to realize that ideal
in everyday practice."r
Laments by bar leaders and promnent lawyers over the "commercialism" of the bar and "declining professionalism" have been
staples of professional discourse throughout the 20th century. 9'
Changes in the structure and organization of law practice, however,
triggered discussion of "declining professionalism" in the 1980s
that, to many observers, seemed more pervasive than that in prior
decades. Yet, the underlying premises of professionalism were
continuations of earlier themes: (1) a cognitive claim that the practice of the law requires knowledge and judgment that laypersons
are unable to evaluate; (2) an organizational claim that, because
clients must make a leap of faith in relying on their lawyers, the
profession must regulate itself; and (3) a moral claim that the
profession's internalized belief system, reinforced by professional
self-regulation, will lead individual lawyers to put the interests of
clients and of the public ahead of their own interests.
The Report of the American Bar Association Commission on
Professionalism (Stanley Report) reflects these claims in its definitions of lawyer professionalism: z Roscoe Pound's description

York City) receive more than S80,000 plus bonuses and fringe benefits. On the other
hand, many solo practitioners at the margins of the profession are reported to have modest or low incomes. See Eno Freedman, Michigan Bar Survey Sings Economic Blues,
NAT'L L., Oct. 21, 1985, at 3 (reporting that 43% of Michigan solo practitioners had
incomes in 1984 of less than $20,000).
189. Eliot Freidson, Memorandum to ABA Commission on Professionalism on Definition
of Professionalism 10 (Oct. 8,1985) (on file with author and the Case Western Reserve
Law Review).
190. Id.
191. See Rayman L. Solomon, Five Crises or One: The Concept of Legal ProfessionalIsm, 1925-1960, In LAWYERS' IDEALS/LAWYERS' PRAcTICES: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE
AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION, supra note 181, at 144 (describing five separate crises of
lawyer professionalism dunng the years studied).
192. Amencan Bar Ass'n Comm'n on Professionalism,
IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC
SERVIcE: A BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM (1986) [hereinafter STANLEY REPORT]. For discussion of the Stanley Report, see Nelson & Trubek, in
LAWYERS' IDEALS/LAWYERS' PRACTICES: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL
PROFESSION, supra note 181; Nancy J. Moore, Professionalism Reconsidered, 1987 AM. B.
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of professionalism as the pursuit "of a learned art in the spirit of a
public service";"9 and a more elaborate definition, supplied by
Commssion member and sociologist Eliot Freidson, stressing the
difficulty clients have in evaluating the quality of legal services
and the need for collective self-regulation to protect clients.'
The bar's emphasis on self-regulation is supported by the conceptual framework of "lawyer independence." Political independence has both an individual and collective aspect: Individual lawyers are to be independent from both the clients and the state so
that they can mediate between the two and not be openly identified
with either; the bar, as a collective, is to abstain from partisan
politics. 95 Independence from the state helps preserve the rights
of individuals against state oppression; independence from the
factional interests of clients prevents lawyers from being identified
with particular causes, enables them to undertake unpopular ones,
and allows a lawyer's personal conscience and awareness of public
interests to limit what is done on behalf of clients.' These aspects of professional independence are meritorious and should be
preserved.

Independence also has an economic aspect-protection from
market competition-that is more problematic in today's world.
Under the traditional approach, the legal monopoly over the prac-

FOUND. R.s. J. 773 (1987).
193. STANLEY REP9RT, supra note 192, at 10 (quoting Roscoe Pound).
194. The Freidson definition of professionalism reads:
[A profession is an] occupation whose members have special privileges, such as
exclusive licensing, that are justified by the following assumptions:

I. That its practice requires substantial intellectual training and the use
of complex judgments.

That since clients cannot adequately evaluate the quality of the
2.
service, they must trust those they consult.
3. That the client's trust presupposes that the practitioner's self-interest is
overbalanced by devotion to serving both the client's interest and the
public good, and
4. That the occupation is self-regulating-that is, organized in such a
way as to assure the public and the courts that its members are compe-

tent, do not violate their client's trust, and transcend their own self-interest.
STANLEY REPORT, supra note 192, at 10 (citation omitted).
195. See Solomon, supra note 191, at 144, 146-47 (arguing that individual lawyers must
be politically independent of clients and that the bar must also abstain from politics).
196. See Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 13
(1988) (exploring and justifying the instances when lawyer independence should be encouraged).
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flee of law is justified by the need to protect clients from unqualified or dishonest practitioners. It also provides a standard of living
that permits a lawyer to provide legal services on a pro bono basis
to those who cannot afford to pay. Control by the bar over the
training, admission, and discipline of lawyers encourages the creation and maintenance of a profession composed of individuals
who put the interests of clients and of the public above the
lawyer's own interests. The moral claim that self-regulation will
produce public-spirited practitioners reflects the ideal that the market ethic of profit maximization ("commercialism") be subordinated
to the interests of client and public.
B. A Modem Vision of "Professionalism"
Today's problem, reflected only obscurely in the laments concermng declining professionalism, is that changes in social conditions have eroded and transformed the traditional claims of lawyer
professionalism. They must be recast if the profession is to adapt
to the realities of the 21st century
The cognitive claim that only lawyers could understand and
evaluate legal services has always been only a partial truth. But the
claim has been undermined since the 1960s by general social
trends, such as the post-Vietnam and post-Watergate distrust of
authority figures and established institutions. The. consumer and
environmental movements rest in part upon the idea that experts
cannot be fully trusted and that important values cannot be left
entirely in their hands. Market forces, civil liability trends, and
consumer regulation are all mechanisms for making experts and
specialists more accountable to consumers. The general acceptance
of the informed-consent idea as a central aspect of a good professional relationship is merely one of the ways the principle of accountability affects lawyers.
Intellectual trends in the law schools have operated in the same
direction since they have spread doubt as to whether law is an
autonomous discipline." Tins notion, a false one in extreme
forms, is bolstered by the fact that legal knowledge, unlike medical
knowledge, is not science-based. Law is a normative business,
involving social, political, and business judgments. Legal realism
has spread thus insight to nonlawyers who demand that they be
197. See Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-

1987, 100 HARV. L. REV. 761 (1987) (arguing that legal thought and the legal system are
no longer autonomous).
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more fully consulted about the ends and means of representation.
The organizational claim that the legal profession is a band of
brothers has suffered a similar fate. The brothers are no longer so
brotherly in three separate senses. First, white male Caucasians
have been joined by many sisters, blacks, and by other ethnic and
cultural minorities. Second, trust and civility in adversary representation has been replaced by costly and harsh negotiation and litigation tactics uncontrolled by either peer pressure or professional
discipline. Turd, de facto specialization accentuates heterogeneity
and discord. Individual lawyers know more and more about less
and less; they have more in common with other specialists than
with lawyers generally Specialization has also endangered independence from clients by relating lawyers on a continuing basis with
particular client interests (e.g., a products liability lawyer prosecuting or defending tobacco claims). Unlike medical specialties which
are defined by natural characteristics of the field of knowledge
(e.g., cardiology, dealing with the cardiovascular system) and skill
functions (e.g., surgery relating to the heart), lawyers are primarily
defined by the activities and interests of their clients and tend to
assume the attitudes and values of the clients they regularly serve.
The moral claim that the special privileges of lawyers are
justified because lawyers act in furtherance of client and public
goals and not in the interest of self or the profession also has less
credibility today G. B. Shaw's dictum that "all professionals are a
conspiracy against the laity""19 has spread from economists and
sociologists to a large part of the general public. Here again, the
contemporary distrust of established institutions has been a contributing factor. But the long term behavior of the organized bar in
response to the major issues of professionalism that have arisen
since World War II has helped to persuade the public, as well as
many lawyers, that the profession does not live up to its pretensions of altruism.' 9
Access to legal services. A longstanding professional duty is
that of assuring that legal services are provided to those who need
them. Until recently, however, the organized bar has opposed vanous means of providing access on the ground that they involved
solicitation, champerty, or illegal practice. Segments of the bar did
198. OXFORD DIcIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 636 (1992).
199. For a similar recital of issues, see Robert W. Gordon & William H. Simon, The
Redemption of Professionalism?,in LAWYERS' IDEALS.LAWYERS' PRACTICES: TRANSFORMA-

TION IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION, supra note 181, at 230, 240-44.
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support group legal services, provision of increased information to
consumers, and publicly funded civil legal assistance. But general
acceptance of those reforms came about primarily over bar opposition as a result of judicial and executive actions.2° The
professional monopolization of routine services, many not requiring
the services of an "expert" with seven years of higher education,
continues to be a problem.
Litigation abuses. Defimng and enforcing procedural rules that
result in fair, accurate, and efficient determinations is a central
responsibility of the legal profession. Despite evidence of an enormous increase in the use of abusive litigation tactics for strategic
purposes, the bar has been unable to agree on ethics rules with any
substantive bite. Professional discipline plays virtually no role in
this area because the relevant ethics rules are stated in vague generalities or are not enforced by disciplinary bodies. Major initiatives in this area have come not from the organized bar but from
the judiciary in the form of sanctions imposed in a particular litigation. Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and its state
analogs are probably the most important development in professional responsibility in recent years, but the bar is still uncertain and
divided about this effort to enforce fairly obvious professional
obligations. The 1993 amendments to Rule 11, pushed by bar
groups but by few federal judges, threaten to eliminate Rule 11 as
a meaningful control on abusive litigation behavior.
Prohibited assistance." Ethics rules prohibit lawyers from
assisting clients in criminal or fraudulent conduct. Yet the organized bar, worried that any ethical requirement other than silent
withdrawal would increase lawyers' exposure to civil liability, has
resisted conforming ethics law to civil and criminal law that sometimes requires a lawyer to take some steps to prevent a client from
carrying out a scheme that the lawyer has learned is criminal or
fraudulent. Modest proposals to permit a lawyer in these situations
to take some additional action have been rejected twice by the
ABA House of Delegates, even though the ABA Committee on
Ethics and Professional Responsibility has criticized the existing

200. See supra notes 150-53 and accompanying text.
201. See generally Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Rectification of Client Fraud: Death and

Revival of a Professional Norm, 33 EMoRY L.. 271 (1984) (explonng the debate over
how lawyers should react to the possibility of client fraud); Susan P. Komak. The Law
Between the Bar and the State, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1389 (1992) (noting the controversy and
tension between disclosure and confidentiality of unlawful client conduct).
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situation as unworkable. The unwillingness of state supreme courts
to adopt the ABA's position on client fraud"0 2 is one indicator
that the organized bar is unresponsive to public concerns that the
profession live up to its ideals of public-spiritedness. The savings
and loan crisis provides a continuing reminder of the temptations
that some lawyers have been unable to resist.
Regulatory compliance. A long-standing professional tradition,
from Brandeis to Lon Fuller, has emphasized the role lawyers can
play by advising clients on self-interested compliance with federal
and state regulatory requirements. The bar continues to defend the
broad ambit of client confidentiality by arguing that only full disclosure by clients will permit the lawyer to guide the client into a
legal course of conduct. Yet, ethics rules, ethics opinions, and lack
of disciplinary enforcement m this area, combined with recurring
scandals such as securities frauds in the 1970s and the savings-andloan debacle of the 1980s, convey the impression that many lawyers, with the acquiescence of the organized bar, conform to the
perspective of Holmes's "bad man" as lawyer-that is, as an advisor who predicts only how officials are likely to behave, a position
that tolerates violation of clear legal prohibitions if enforcement is
unlikely or proof is unlikely to be available.
The fundamental conditions that have resulted in erosion of
some aspects of traditional professionalism are realities that the
profession's belief system must accommodate:
* Competition in legal services markets is a fact of life that
will not go away The vast and growing numbers of lawyers, the entrepreneurial spirit of the American bar, and the
growing responsiveness to consumer desires ensure a highly
competitive milieu for law practice in the 21st century.
* Lawyer specialization is the source of much of the fragmentation and internal discord of the profession, but it
would be hopeless and unwise to oppose it.
202. A recent review of the law in all American junsdictions on lawyer disclosure of
client fraud found that only five states agree with the position taken in the ABA's Model
Rule 1.6 which prohibits disclosure m all instances other than those in which the client

intends to take criminal action that imminently threatens life or serious bodily injury. The
remaning jurisdictions either permit or, in rare instances, require disclosure, either to
prevent financial harm or to rectify its consequences. Analysis of "Noisy Withdrawal"
Comment Under ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6, ALAS Loss PREVENTION
J., Jan. 1993, at 18-19. ALAS is the Attorney Liability Assurance Society, a legal malpractice insurance company providing insurance to many of the country's largest law firms
with principal offices outside New York City.
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- Growth of law practice in large private and public organizations has undermined the autonomy of individual lawyers,
but it is unthinkable that the profession would or could
return to a small-firm, individual-practice model.
- Subservience of law firms to the scrutiny and control of
corporate clients and to consumer demands for accountability reduce the autonomy of lawyers, but the profession is
not in a position to resist either force.
- Growth of an extreme model of adversarial advocacy
("Rambo litigation") dilutes the lawyer's public responsibilities. But the organized bar is divided on the issue of how
adversarial a lawyer should be and is unwilling to take the
initiative to control abusive litigation tactics.
The unsettling changes in the conditions of legal practice are
not only here to stay; they have many positive aspects. Accountability, competition, specialization, and efficient organization have
brought more good than harm. A more diverse profession provides
better service with a wider range of price and quality to more
people than ever before. The professional ideology of an earlier
day was founded on paternalism ("only we can make judgments
about legal matters") and hypocrisy ("we are never influenced by
our own welfare but act only in the interest of the public") that are
no longer acceptable.
The profession's view of itself must be reshaped in a more
responsible, realistic, and truthful manner. The idealistic tradition of
the profession, and especially the aspiration to balance service to
client and self with regard for the interests of others, is one of the
foundations on which a reshaped ethic can be built. The challenge
is one of creating a new vision, courageous and truthful, of what it
means to be a lawyer m today's world.
I believe the major elements of a renewed vision will be:
• A lawyer who cares about clients, who is accountable to
them, who engages in moral dialogue with them, and who
wants the legal profession to see that client interests are
protected.
• A lawyer who cares about equal access to justice and
who strives for efficiency in the provision of legal services.
And
* A lawyer who brings his or her moral conscience to bear
on everytung done as a lawyer.
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These three principles suggest a series of remedial steps that
might work in the right direction. At the very least, they will do
little harm which is the first and most fundamental admomtion that
every professional should obey. The concluding portion of this
paper summarizes those recommended steps.
IV

A.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Protecting Clients from Lawyer Misconduct

1. Client Trust Accounts
Embezzlement or loss of client funds or property is a continuing and substantial problem causing harm to clients and impairing
the reputation of the legal profession. In general, court rules or
statutes require a lawyer to keep client funds in trust accounts
subject to detailed accounting requirements. Except for a few
states, however, no preventive steps are taken to assure lawyer
compliance. Rules regulating trust accounts should be amended to
make it clear that accounting records relating to client trust accounts are subject to inspection at any time by bar disciplinary
authorities. In addition, a program of random auditing of trust
accounts should be instituted in each jurisdiction.
2. Client Security Funds
Most states have created funds to reimburse clients for some
losses resulting from lawyer theft. But current client security funds
lack sufficient assets and are severely restricted in the type and
amount of client losses that are reimbursed. The size and availability of reimbursement of client losses from security funds should be
improved. Alternatively, lawyers should be required to purchase
annually a fidelity bond in the amount of the maximum amount in
client trust fund accounts during the prior year.
3. Reporting of Malpractice Awards
Although many malpractice cases involve individual instances
of careless or negligent lawyering not deserving professional discipline, other malpractice cases involve serious violations of professional duty Lawyers should be required to report settlements or
money judgments in malpractice cases to the relevant disciplinary
agency 3 The agency's professional staff should screen the re203. If the settlement is sealed, the lawyer involved should file the pleadings and court
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ports to determine whether the conduct merits a disciplinary
charge. The disciplinary agency's file of malpractice awards or
judgments concerning a particular lawyer should be treated as a
public file available to any person upon request.
4. Opening Disciplinary Proceedings to Public View
The profession's resistance to treating disciplinary proceedings
in the same manner as all other aspects of the justice system-as
public proceedings open to public attendance, observation, and
comment-has outlived its time. The clubby notion that bar discipline should be carried on secretly by the brethren of the bar has
little relevance to current conditions. The better position is that of
Oregon, wich treats any complaint against a lawyer the same as a
complaint filed in a court of general jurisdiction as the beginning
of a public proceeding. Failing that, the current ABA position that
disciplinary proceedings should be open and public once the disciplinary body has found probable cause to proceed is a second best.
B. Assuring Competent Lawyering: Malpractice Liability
Professional discipline does not and probably cannot provide
much protection against incompetent (negligent) lawyering. Disciplinary authorities generally consider competence questions only
when a lawyer's incompetence is egregious or repeated or when
incompetence is combined with other, more serious violations. Civil
liability for malpractice protects clients by providing a remedy for
past harm caused by negligent lawyermg. The efficacy of this
remedy and its deterrent effect on lawyer behavior could be improved in several respects:
1. Mandatory Malpractice Insurance Coverage
Many lawyers, especially those who practice in the individualclient sector of the profession, do not purchase malpractice insurance. State law should require a licensed attorney to purchase a
mimmum amount of malpractice insurance coverage (perhaps
$100,000). Since some lawyers might not be able to obtain private
insurance coverage, the state bar should arrange for fall-back coverage of these lawyers. Although some part-time lawyers will be
discouraged by this modest requirement, its benefits far outweigh
potential drawbacks.
disposition with the disciplinary body, which would then be a position to undertake fur-

ther investigation if warranted.
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Ethics Rules in Malpractice Actions

The profession's position that ethics rules are neither relevant
nor admissible in malpractice actions should be reversed. Because
ethics rules are framed to protect clients and the public, they provide inmmium standards of conduct that are relevant in malpractice
actions. Rule provisions should be admissible in malpractice actions
and their weight determined as a question of law by the court.
Some ethics standards codify agency and fiduciary standards;
breach of such standards (e.g., a breach of confidentiality or a
severe conflict of interest) should be treated as determining the
standard of care (negligence per se). In some such cases, the presentation of expert testimony concerning the standard of care will
not be required to make out a prima facie case of liability.
Other ethics rules state a general standard to be applied and
interpreted by the fact finder under proper instructions. In such
cases, the ethics rules, should be admissible and relevant evidence
of the standard of care, but expert testimony should continue to be
required to assist in its application and interpretation. Ethics rules
that are aspirational in character (e.g., Model Rule 6.1) should not
be treated as relevant or admissible on the standard of care. As is
the case with safety and regulatory standards, compliance with an
ethics rule (e.g., exercising discretion not to take an action) should
not shield a lawyer's conduct from scrutiny under the general
negligence standard of due care under all circumstances.
C. Assuring Fairness in Lawyer-Client Relations
1. Compulsory Arbitration of Fee Disputes at Client's Request
A frequent source of disagreement between lawyers and clients
involves questions relating to a lawyer's fee. Jurisdictions should
be urged to provide by law for fair and expeditious arbitration of
fee disputes if the client so requests. The neutral arbitral body
should be composed of an equal number of lawyer and non-lawyer
members. The arbitration mechanism should be viewed as a required term of the lawyer-client contract. Under this proposal, the
client would be free to seek other remedies, but the lawyer's consent to binding arbitration would be inferred from the retainer
agreement.
2.

Contingent Fee Agreements

Clients are pressured occasionally to enter into contingent fee
agreements before considering alternative representation. To prevent
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this form of overreaching, a contingent fee agreement should be
voidable at the client's option within ten days of its execution.
Lawyers, however, should not be discouraged from timely fact
investigation and other work that will preserve or advance the
client's rights. The lawyer's work during the period of voidability
should be compensated on a quantum meruit basis if it is valuable
and is turned over, along with client records, to successor counsel.
In addition, statutes or case law in every jurisdiction should make
it clear that a trial court, sua sponte, may consider the fairness of
the contingent fee arrangement in the particular context.
3. Sexual Relations with Clients
An ethics rule in each jurisdiction should prohibit a lawyer
from engaging in sexual relations with an individual client during
the period of representation. Preexisting sexual relationships should
be excepted unless the circumstances suggest a conflict of interest
or breach of another professional duty.
4. Communication in Writing to a Represented Person
The breadth of the anti-contact rule, prohibiting a lawyer from
direct contact with a represented party (e.g., Model Rule 4.2),
limits the ability of clients to be informed about their matters.
Lawyers' control over the channels of communication should be
reduced by permitting a lawyer to send a copy of an offer of settlement or other communication relating to a material development
in a case to the lawyer's client.
D. Enhanced Competition in Legal Services Markets
1. Limitation of the Professional Monopoly
Consumers would benefit from the provision of a variety of
quasi-legal services by nonlawyers or by organizations composed
only partly of lawyers. The statutes prohibiting the practice of law
by unlicensed practitioners should be amended or interpreted to
limit the professional monopoly to its historic core-the representation of clients before courts of general jurisdiction. In addition,
courts should recognize legislative authority to regulate the legal
profession and related occupations. The judicial doctrine that the
inherent authority of a state's ugh court to regulate courtroom
proceedings excludes any legislative regulation of law practice,
paralegals, and related activities is unsound and undesirable. The
public, through its elected representatives, needs to have a voice in
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the regulation of the legal profession.
2. Solicitation of Legal Business
Efforts by lawyers to obtain legal business should not be regulated, except that in-person solicitation of individual clients should
be limited by time, place, and manner restrictions and by prohibitions against the use of false or misleading information in seeking
legal business. Provision of living expenses to needy clients should
also be allowed when necessary to permit a client to await a judicial disposition of the client's case, provided that no such agreement be discussed or made until 30 days after a written fee retention agreement has been signed.
3. Form-of-Practice Restrictions
The current restrictions on ownership and control of organizations engaged in the practice of law (e.g., Model Rule 5.4) curtail
investment and restrict competition in legal services markets to the
detriment of consumers. The amended rule should be substantially
the same as that proposed by the Kutak Commission's 1981 draft:
A lawyer may be employed by an organization in
which a financial interest is held or managerial authority is
exercised by a non-lawyer or by a lawyer acting in a capacity other than that of representing clients, such as a
business corporation, insurance company, legal services
organization, or government agency, but only if the terms
of the relationship provide in writing that:
(a) there is no interference with the lawyer's independence of professional judgment or with the clientlawyer relationship;
(b) information relating to representation of a client is
protected as required by Rule 1.6;
(c) the arrangement does not involve advertising or
personal contact with prospective clients prohibited by
Rules 7.2 and 7.3; and
(d) the arrangement does not result in charging a fee
that violates Rule 1.5.
4. Multistate Practice of Law
The increasingly national and international character of law
practice requires that more generous provisions be made for
multistate and international practice. The unauthorized practice
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restrictions should be interpreted so as not to apply to lawyers
admitted in another U.S. jurisdiction, but lawyers handling matters
that are centered in a particular state should be subject to that
state's disciplinary rules and malpractice liability Admission pro
hac vice should be liberally provided to out-of-state attorneys, and
rules requiring association of local counsel in the representation
should be waived in any situation in which the requirement would
impose a costly hardship or unduly interfere with a client's choice
of lawyer.
5. Market Test for Legal Education
Entrants to the legal profession are now generally required to
complete seven years of higher education before becoming eligible
for admission to the bar. These requirements become part of the
cost structure of legal services, restricting the access of lower income people to routine legal services: Substantial educational requirements are appropriate for a learned profession, but a market
test of these entry requirements should be introduced by reducing
the required educational accomplishment to three years of university-level education and two years of study at an ABA-approved law
school. Law schools would be required to justify whether tuition
and other expenses of the current educational program are market
justified. Is their value worth the amounts required to satisfy them
to students and to legal employers? A more radical proposal, suggested by Judge Posner, would eliminate all educational requirements for taking bar examinations, but its consequences might be
far-reaching and unanticipated.
E. Provision of Legal Services for the Poor
1. Funding of Civil Legal Assistance for the Poor
Mandatory IOLTA programs (Interest on Lawyers' Trust Accounts) have a capacity to generate substantial funds for the support of civil legal assistance for poor people. Voluntary IOLTA
programs should be converted to a mandatory form and the income
earmarked for provision of civil legal assistance to individuals
meeting eligibility requirements. The federal government should be
urged to provide matching funds for state and private funds given
to recognized legal service organizations.
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Student Loan Payback Program

An infusion of able lawyers into legal services programs benefiting the poor (primarily legal aid and public defender organizations) would be stimulated by federal legislation mandating partial
payment of a law graduate's accumulated student loans for periods
devoted to low-income service in these organizations. For example,
legislation might provide that 10% of a graduate's loan obligation
or $10,000, whichever is smaller, be paid by the federal government for each year of low-income public service. An additional or
alternative recommendation is that funds provided to public service
lawyers by law school programs should not be treated as taxable
income to the recipient.
3.

Restructuring of Federal Legal Services Program

The federal legal services program should be restructured by
amendment of the Legal Services Corporation Act. To assure that
poor clients get the same representation as those who can afford to
pay, the program should be shifted largely to a Judicare model in
which the eligible client picks a lawyer from those enrolled in the
program. The present legal services organizations would screen
clients for eligibility, make a preliminary assessment to ensure that
a meritorious claim was involved, refer clients to lawyers enrolled
in the program, and provide traimng, support, and specialized substantive assistance to lawyers participating in the program either on
a volunteer basis (pro bono) or as paid participants. Fee reimbursement to private lawyers handling poor clients' matters would be
restricted to relatively modest statutory formulas, such as a fixed
amount for an uncontested divorce. Class actions and social advocacy would be left largely to private groups under current fee-shifting statutes, although existing legal services specialists would provide expert assistance on significant poverty law matters raised by
individual cases referred to members of the private bar. These
changes would create a more traditional lawyer-client relationship
in publicly-funded legal services, ensure that poor people are
treated in much the same way as middle class clients are handled
by the private bar, and eliminate most of the political controversy
from the legal services program. The diminution of political controversy would make possible over time an expansion of funding that
would come much closer than present arrangements to our ideal of
equal access.
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Protecting Third Personsfrom Harm

1. Judicial Sanctions for Litigation Abuses
A central aspect of professional responsibility is constant vigilance in assuring fair, accurate, and efficient modes of dispute
resolution by courts and other tribunals. The increasing incidence
of excessive advocacy for strategic purposes such as delay, cost,
and harassment deserves not only professional condemnation but
support for the development of standards of behavior and their
effective enforcement. Use of such tactics inposes costs on the
tribunal, harms opposing parties, and brings lawyers and the court
system into public disrepute. Professional discipline has not dealt
with litigation abuses, except in the most pathological cases such
as clear suborning of perjury, because the ethics requirements are
stated in vague generalities (e.g., Model Rules 3.1 and 3.3), and
disciplinary bodies are generally unwilling to punish lawyers for
over-zealousness. The development of judicially-imposed sanctions
in litigated proceedings, however, has had beneficial effects on
litigative behavior: discouragement of frivolous assertions and deterrence of tactical litigation abuses. The organized profession
should support federal and state court rules that permit or require
the imposition of sanctions on lawyers and parties who abuse the
litigation process: (1) mandatory sanctions for deliberate litigation
abuses carried out in bad faith; and (2) permissive sanctions for
asserting claims or defenses that are not grounded in fact and law
(i.e., requirement of a reasonable inquiry into the factual and legal
foundation of assertions).
2. Permissive Disclosure of Ongoing or Future
Client Crime or Fraud
The unwillingness of the ABA to permit a lawyer to take steps
other than silent withdrawal to prevent or rectify an ongoing or
future client crime or fraud that has harmed or threatens harm to
thiurd persons is one of the great self-inflicted wounds of the legal
profession in the 20th century. Prompt steps should be taken to
encourage the ABA to change this position. Perhaps more vital,
given the intransigence of the House of Delegates on this issue, is
the organized efforts by other lawyer groups to urge state courts to
retain or expand ethics rules that permit disclosure of ongoing or
future client crime or fraud. In addition, groups in the profession
should be more supportive of imposing liability on lawyers for
fraud and negligence for knowingly assisting a client in the con-
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summation of a fraudulent transaction. Confidentiality is an important value, but it should not be treated as an absolute with only
one major exception: protection of lawyers from harm. Third persons also deserve protection from the wrongful acts of clients that
involve the use of a lawyer's services and lawyer knowledge of an
ongoing or future crime or fraud.
3. Prohibition of Retaliatory Discharge for Reporting
Client or Lawyer Misconduct
The legal profession holds itself out to the public as a group
that enforces the obligations of its members by requiring lawyers
and judges to report the serious professional misconduct of another
lawyer. Although this duty is honored more in the breach than in
the observance, it is unconscionable not to protect a lawyer who
has fulfilled the duty that ethics rules require. The retaliatory discharge of a lawyer by a law firm because the lawyer has reported
serious misconduct of another lawyer should be treated as a disciplinary violation and a civilly actionable wrong. Similar judicial
protection, by elaboration of common law retaliatory discharge law,
should also be provided to corporate counsel who are wrongfully
discharged. Although a client may discharge a lawyer, acting as
such, for any reason, it does not follow that an employer may
terminate an employment relation without penalty when the discharge is based on a lawyer perfornng a professional obligation
not to assist an employer in criminal or fraudulent conduct.

